


JPRS-TAC-88-045  
22 DECEMBER 1988



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# ***JPRS Report***



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## Intrabloc

### GDR's Stoph on Nuclear Threat, Disarmament Proposal

AU0912175588 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND  
in German 6 Dec 88 p 3

[Toast proposed by Willi Stoph, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, at a dinner given in honor of Mieczyslaw Rakowski, chairman of the PPR Council of Ministers, in Berlin on 5 December: "With Joint Forces on the Path of Socialism"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

### Prospects for a World Without Nuclear Threat Have Improved

For this reason, during our talks we have accorded central importance to the expansion of economic cooperation, to the exchange of views on the possibilities of closer collaboration in the development and application of key technologies and the more efficient joint utilization of the results obtained from scientific-technological progress for the comprehensive intensification of the national economies in both countries. We have drawn up a positive balance sheet of the implementation of the "Long-Term Program of the Development of Cooperation in the Spheres of Science, Technology, and Production Through the Year 2000." At the same time, we are in agreement that further reserves are still to be tapped.

Dear Comrades! Our meeting is taking place at the end of a year which has brought encouraging progress for lasting peace and cooperation based on mutual respect among all nations on our planet, which is so threatened. Owing to the constructive and flexible peace policy of the socialist states, in particular the initiative of the Soviet Union, through the commitment of a broad world public, as well as through the realism of leading Western politicians, the prospects for a world without nuclear weapons have increased. A change for the better is emerging in international relations. That has been clearly proved by the elimination of the Soviet and U.S. intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

The contractually agreed upon elimination of an entire category of the most modern weapons is historically unique and has given a strong impetus to mankind's struggle for a nuclear-weapon free future.

We are aware that disarmament is still a delicate young plant which needs to be cultivated intensively by all men of good will, to allow it to grow up to become a strong tree. The Warsaw Pact countries, including the GDR and the People's Republic of Poland, submitted extremely relevant and realistic proposals in 1988, to create a favorable climate in this respect.

Halving the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the U.S. while strictly adhering to the ABM Treaty, is the most important thing. No less necessary is the gradual discontinuation of nuclear weapons tests, a worldwide ban on chemical weapons and tactical nuclear weapons, as well as the beginning of a reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals. With our proposals, we ask no more of the other side than we ourselves are ready to give. This holds true for the extent and strict verification of arms reductions. That is the secret of the strong impact of socialist peace policy, which is being backed by an increasingly large number of people. This should also be noted by those who still believe that they can secure their positions by modernizing their weapons and by nuclear deterrence.

Already now the price that mankind must pay for such outdated thinking is too high. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the idea to create peace not by confrontation but by cooperation, and to replace risky deterrence by a partnership of security and a community based on common responsibility, is being supported by an increasing number of people precisely in Europe. The sad experience of two world wars, as well as the highest concentration of forces and arms have made people here particularly sensitive to the danger of nuclear annihilation. The GDR derives special responsibility for peace and disarmament from the fact that, in the past, considerable suffering—originating from German territory—was inflicted on other nations, as well as from its situation on the border between the world's most powerful military coalitions.

### Support for Wojciech Jaruzelski's Disarmament Proposal

It considers it its duty to promote the disarmament which has been started by its own initiatives, and by trusting and businesslike cooperation with the Western countries. The removal of nuclear and chemical weapons from Central Europe, as suggested by the GDR and the CSSR, as well as the project suggested by the SED and the SPD to create a zone of confidence and security in central Europe are highly suitable for reducing military confrontation in this region, reducing the offensive potential, and accelerating the geographical separation of the Warsaw Pact's and NATO's military capabilities. In this connection, we fully support the proposal submitted by Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski on reducing armaments and enhancing confidence in Central Europe.

With its policy of dialogue, cooperation, and confidence-building, the GDR has proved to be a reliable and predictable partner in efforts for a peaceful future of mankind. We consider the Helsinki Final Act to be a solid foundation for the common European home that we want to set up, in which all residents live side by side in security and on the basis of equality, and cooperate on the basis of confidence.

The GDR continues to attach considerable importance to the further strengthening of socialism and to the deepening of cooperation within the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, as has been done in the past. Besides pursuing the well-tried forms of political and economic cooperation, we are in favor of embarking on new, effective roads wherever necessary.

We consider coordinating the economic plans for the period 1991 through 1995 to be an essential prerequisite for this.

Dear Comrades and friends!

Our party and all the working people in our country have always observed with sympathy and understanding the considerable efforts that the Polish communists, allied with all the patriotic forces in the country, have made to further build socialism in their country under Poland's special national conditions. We highly respect the impressive achievements attained by the Polish fraternal people during more than 40 years of the worker-peasant power.

These achievements cannot be denied by anybody. Much rather, it has turned out that just as on German soil, socialism is also irrevocable in our eastern neighbor's country. Dear Polish friends, you can continue to rely on our firm affection and solidarity. We wholeheartedly wish you much success in resolving the ambitious tasks that you have set yourselves for the further implementation of the resolutions adopted by the 10th PZPR Congress.

Dear friends! In implementing the resolutions adopted at the 11th party congress, our party continues to shape the developed socialist society in the GDR. It is heading for the 12th party congress, which has been convened for May 1990, with major initiatives and considerable optimism.

Owing to the diligent work of all the working people, a successful balance of what has been achieved to date could be struck at the Seventh SED Central Committee Meeting. At the same time, significant tasks were decided upon; tasks that are aimed at the continuation of the well-tried course of the unity of economic and social policy. In the future we will also provide answers to the new questions posed by life, and will try to find solutions that take into account the current requirements and specific conditions in our country. In doing so, we are making use of the experiences of the fraternal countries.

Dear Comrades and friends! Together we will commemorate next year the 45th anniversary of Poland's rebirth, and the 40th anniversary of the founding of the GDR. [passage omitted]

**CSSR, Poland's Urban Support Soviet Cutbacks**  
*AU0812161988 Paris AFP in English 1549 GMT*  
8 Dec 88

[Excerpts] Bonn, Dec 8 (AFP)—European leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain continued Thursday to welcome Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's proposed military cutbacks on the continent, describing them as a major step toward disarmament. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile in the East bloc, Czechoslovakia "totally supports the vast new proposals", official spokesman Miroslav Pavel said in Prague.

Soviet troop reductions and reorganization there, as well as in East Germany and Hungary, would contribute "to a new easing in tension in Europe," he added.

This and other Soviet initiatives showed "that the new thinking, realism, flexibility and desire for political dialogue constitute a firm programme".

Polish Government spokesman Jerzy Urban, in Rome for a two-day visit, said that although the proposal "does not affect Poland", Warsaw "expects bilateral meetings (that is, with the Soviet Union) on conventional arms reduction".

He said there was "a Soviet contingent whose character is essentially defensive" in Poland.

**Bulgaria**

**Gorbachev UN Speech Hailed by BTA's Khranov**  
*AU0812190788 Sofia BTA in English 1835 GMT*  
8 Dec 88

["Platform of New Political Thinking"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, December 8 (BTA political observer Nencho Khranov)—The speech of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev delivered at the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly can be rightfully assessed as a complex program and a real platform of new political thinking. This remarkable speech rang all over the world as a sincere appeal for democratization, humanization and true restructuring of contemporary international relations.

A detailed analysis of the objective laws governing the world on the threshold of the 21st century was made. The analysis calls for a new philosophy of diplomacy and state-to-state relations. This philosophy requires that we should jointly seek the way leading to the supremacy of the universal human idea and to assuring the world's solidarity and the stability and dynamism of international relations.

The statesman whose name has become synonymous to a new way of addressing international affairs and to a political approach in solving intricate international

problems once again laid emphasis on dialogue. The Soviet Union favours a more substantive political dialogue and strengthening of the political prerequisites needed to improve the international climate.

It logically leads to the imperative of upgrading the prestige and reinvigorating the peace-making role of the United Nations Organization, whose historic mission is to assist its members in coping with the daunting challenges of our time and working to humanize their relations. This is an essential part of the theory and practice of present-day Soviet foreign policy.

The dailies all over the world have every reason to frontpage the news about the Soviet Union's decision, announced by Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, to reduce unilaterally the numerical strength of its armed forces by 500,000 men, along with a substantial reduction of the weapons and military equipment stationed in Europe. This is a gesture which tangibly proves the Soviet Union's readiness to do everything for the improvement of the international situation and to build security on the basis of a reasonable defence sufficiency. The unilateral reductions will provide a stimulus to the future talks on conventional disarmament in Europe and will have a favourable effect on the whole complex of negotiations on arms control and international security.

Mr Mikhail Gorbachev's speech is shot through with realism and responsibility before his people and the peoples of the world. Nobody harbours any illusions that the rivalry and the contradictions between the different socioeconomic and political systems in our complicated world will come to an end. The most important thing is that the rivalry should acquire the character of a peaceful competition with due respect to freedom of choice and balance of interest. This thought of the Soviet leader's is a key to understanding contemporary international problems.

### Czechoslovakia

#### CSSR Reaction to Gorbachev Announcement

**Government Supports Soviet Reduction Proposals**  
*LD0812145088 Prague CTK in English 1317 GMT  
8 Dec 88*

[Text] Prague Dec 8 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak Government fully supports the new extensive proposals for improving the international situation, presented by President Mikhail Gorbachev at the U.N. General Assembly session, it said in a statement read by head of the press department of the Czechoslovak Government Presidium office Miroslav Pavel today.

The proposed withdrawal of six tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary by 1991 and reorganization of the units temporarily stationed in these countries in order to give them a clearly defensive structure will undoubtedly contribute towards a further

easing of tension in Europe. Also the other initiatives of the USSR prove that new thinking, realism, flexibility and will to conduct a political dialogue are a firm and invariable program of world socialism, the statement said.

**Gorbachev's 'Clock of History' Speech Analyzed**  
*LD0812234988 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730  
GMT 8 Dec 88*

[Jiri Cebrovsky commentary: "A Message to Civilization"]

[Text] What we heard yesterday from New York when Mikhail Gorbachev spoke to mankind about mankind was the clock of history ticking—no recriminations or criticism, nor even poetic rosy visions of the 21st century. Instead of this, what the highest Soviet state representative had to say was serious and yet straightforward. Peace cannot be imposed by orders, peace is not something for two or three states, but for all; debts cannot be paid off by incurring more debts; it is a bad thing if a full man says to a hungry man: It is your own fault; the less nuclear weapons there are, the greater our chances of not being wiped out by acid rain; space is the cradle of mankind, but the weapons which man wants to send up there could be mankind's grave.

Yes, what we heard yesterday in New York was the clock of history ticking—we heard that it was high time that people understood and recognized that the world is changing at breakneck speed, that the world is mutually interconnected, interdependent, and that anyone who does not understand this truth and refuses to acknowledge it is acting against his own interests and, at the same time, against those of everyone else. These were not harsh words of condemnation—after all, why should the wish and enthusiasm to alter the structure of the world and the life of its people or the effort to build instead of destroy be a matter of passing verdicts?

Man has so many weapons that he could wipe himself out many times over in a matter of seconds, yet against the forces of nature he is impotent; this is something which also occurred to those who listened to the ideas of the representative of a country, part of which has been hit by a tragic earthquake.

Mikhail Gorbachev's UN speech was not a dictatorship of words, but rather the defining line of new thinking—a message to civilization, you might say, and lent even greater weight by the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev bound up this philosophy for the future with pledges undertaken by a major world power showing how the prospect of a more peaceful and more secure world can be brought nearer.

I will leave it to others to make a detailed analysis of the significance of all the Soviet proposals made yesterday—to the regional conflict analysts, to the disarmament experts, to scientists in the field of ecology or space

medicine, to the politicians at international conferences, and to the diplomats in the corridors. Let them all ponder and think through the importance of these Soviet measures. One thing, however, can be said even now: Hidden in Gorbachev's message to civilization is one immensely important principle: If we want to accomplish something, we must be prepared to get around the table, and we have a duty to set an example.

What we heard yesterday in New York when Mikhail Gorbachev spoke to mankind about mankind was the clock of history ticking—ticking in time with the pulse of all our lives, and many of us, I believe, will fully understand that it is up to us alone to ensure that this tick does not turn into the tick of the time bomb of the nuclear arms build-up.

**USSR Measures Will 'Not Diminish' Pact**  
*AUI212163988 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech*  
9 Dec 88 p 6

[Milan Jelinek commentary in the "We Comment" column: "A Gesture, an Example, an Emphasis"]

[Text] On Wednesday [7 December] Mikhail Gorbachev announced from the UN rostrum that during the next 2 years the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces will be reduced by 500,000 men. The Soviet leadership's decision was part of the program of new international relations presented by Mikhail Gorbachev to the world public. It promptly attracted considerable attention, for it is in fact extremely significant and touches on the most burning elementary problem—disarmament; it also concerns the inhabitants of many states on our continent, among them the people in Czechoslovakia as well.

Let us stress that the six tank divisions of the Soviet Army will not only be withdrawn—these military formations will be disbanded, thus substantially limiting the volume of conventional weapons. On the whole, this measure will reduce the Soviet Army's armament by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 fighter planes. The number of troops and the amount of technology in Soviet detachments stationed on the GDR, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian territories will be reduced by a total of 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks. According to preliminary data from unofficial sources, the Soviet troops withdrawn from our territory will equal about one tank division.

The reaction of our public and the world public to this was overwhelming: welcome.

However, now we can hear from the NATO camp words of appreciation for the Soviet decision, which are intermixed with disparaging objections and doubts; we hear voices saying: all right, but they could have reduced far more.... In reply one could simply ask: What reduction of Soviet troops would the NATO Pact consider sufficient? A 50- or 75-percent reduction, or would the gentlemen perhaps like a round 100 percent on the Soviet side?

What must be done to induce the Western partners—NATO Pact members—to take a seat at the same table as the Soviet Union and its socialist allies and (refraining from an exchange of declarative statements) to conduct serious negotiations on how one could speedily start to disarm, and in what stages? The attitude adopted by certain Western politicians (above all by Western generals) resembles an unacceptable bid and counter-bid game: you go on reducing the troops and disarming, and we will go on endlessly making up our minds about whether we should join you. This approach seems to cover the wish to acquire military advantages.

The Soviet measure is a unilateral step, a commitment without preliminary conditions—the USSR is simply determined to turn it into reality within 2 years. However, the disarmament problem cannot be resolved via the principle of one-sidedness. The notion that one side will be disarming, taking off its armor, while the other side retains all its armor and even adds to it; this notion is so naive that it probably makes any comment superfluous. It is clear to any sensible and logically thinking person that disarmament can be finally resolved only on the principle of mutuality, while preserving equal security and equality. The Soviet measure must be understood as a step which opens doors and consolidates trust, as clear and indisputable proof of the Soviet Union and its socialist allies saying: Yes, we do mean it seriously, we want to disarm, and we want to do it together with you.

The Soviet decision (adopted in line with the interests of its allies) leads to yet another consequence, one which will make an increasingly strong impact during the next 2 years. The main thing is to exclude the possibility of a sudden, unexpected attack by one side against the other. We have here a project to set up a zone of confidence, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations along the line of contact between NATO and Warsaw Pact member states. This significant initiative, presented by CPCZ Central Committee General Secretary Milos Jakes, pursues the same idea as the one which stood (together with other ideas) at the birth of the Soviet decisions: to withdraw offensive military systems from the border separating the two military-political groupings (particularly such components of the Armed Forces as tanks, the artillery, and the offensive tactical air force).

The USSR's unilateral step does not diminish in the least the socialist community's defense ability. Gorbachev declared that the Soviet troops remaining on the territories of European allies after the reduction will be reorganized in order to give them an exclusively defensive structure. They will be capable of intercepting any enemy attack and of providing time for moving up the mechanized reserves. The socialist states consider this situation temporary, expecting it to last just until the conventional disarmament in Europe begins and an agreement is reached with the Western partners on a radical reduction of armed forces and military technology.

Socialist Czechoslovakia firmly supports the idea of the future as presented by the top Soviet representative in the United Nations. It is in line with our own interests as well. The decisions proclaimed by M. Gorbachev are identical with the goals pursued by our foreign policy. We are contributing our share to building our secure European Home—and our significant initiative remains a valid offer.

We are convinced that now, after Mikhail Gorbachev's UN speech, it is essential and high time to start disarming (as in the sphere of nuclear weapons) as well as in the sphere of conventional weapons in Europe.

### German Democratic Republic

**GDR Representatives to Swiss Maneuvers Named**  
*AU2111201288 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 19-20 Nov 88 p 5*

[Text] Bern (ADN)—In line with the Stockholm Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe, observers from CSCE states are following the Swiss "Fire Thorn" maneuver. Colonel Dieter Hantuschke and Colonel Norbert Pabst, officers of the National People's Army, will be the representatives of the GDR in the maneuver area from 20 to 24 November.

**GDR Officers End Saxony Exercise Observation**  
*LD3011152588 Hamburg DPA in German 1426 GMT 30 Nov 88*

[Excerpt] Bergen-Altensalzkoeth (DPA)—Today our GDR Army officers described their 48-hour observation of the Bundeswehr exercise "Sachsentrass" in Lower Saxony as a success. NVA Colonel Klaus Haase said today at the conclusion of his visit to the Bergen-Altensalzkoeth (Celle District) that he and his colleagues had received "sufficient information, which contributed to the building of trust".

Haase said that this was the GDR's last chance this year to follow the exercise, which had to be announced in accordance with the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe. The result of the inspection will soon be presented in written form to the members of this conference. [passage omitted]

### State Reaction to Gorbachev Arms Proposal

**Honecker Praises Gorbachev Arms Offer at UN**  
*LD0712213888 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 2014 GMT 7 Dec 88*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Owing to the peace initiatives of socialist, nonaligned, and other states, and owing to the efforts of peace-loving and realistic forces throughout the world, positive trends in international developments are

beginning to emerge. The peoples regard the implementation of the Soviet Union and the United States Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles as a hopeful initial step toward nuclear disarmament. This assessment was made by Erich Honecker, general secretary of the Central Committee of the SED and chairman of the GDR Council of State, on Wednesday during a dinner in honor of Raif Dizdarevic, president of the SFRY Presidency.

The meeting with Raif Dizdarevic is taking place at an eventful and important time, when states and peoples have to reach decisions with very far-reaching implications. It is thus only natural that the questions of safeguarding peace, disarmament, and international peaceful cooperation are given special attention in the talks.

Erich Honecker said that the statement made today at the United Nations by Mikhail Gorbachev, that the Soviet Union over the next 2 years will unilaterally reduce forces by 500,000 men in its Armed Forces and will reduce corresponding weapons, deserves great respect and approval. The withdrawal, coordinated with the allies, of 6 tank divisions from the GDR, the CSSR, and Hungary—comprising 5,000 tanks and 50,000 men—is also of historic significance.

The GDR welcomes and fully supports the new, far-reaching proposals and initiatives which were tabled by Mikhail Gorbachev today. They are aimed at continuing and strengthening the disarmament process with new, concrete steps. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact member states are thus once again making important unilateral concessions in the interests of guaranteeing international security and strengthening peace. This testifies to its seriousness and determination in the implementation of its peace program.

Erich Honecker said that the GDR is an active joint architect of this program, which is aimed at comprehensive and complete disarmament. It does not leave out any type of weapon, includes the strictest control measures, and preserves in each phase the principle of equality and equal security.

It fills us with satisfaction that the Nonaligned Movement is strengthening its commitment to securing peace, effective disarmament, and the democratic restructuring of the system of international political and economic relations. We salute the decisions of the most recent foreign ministers conference in Nicosia. The GDR representative said that, with the nomination of your country as host for the Ninth Summit of Nonaligned States, the role of your country in this movement is held in high esteem.

The GDR sees its responsibility as contributing to as well as advancing its own initiatives for securing peace. In so doing it is continuing its policy of dialogue and cooperation. The GDR will continue to do everything to strengthen the forces of reason and realism which act to improve international relations.



We see the peaceful future of the people of our continent in a common Europe now. All states are trying to contribute ideas for its creation, the speaker stressed. In our view, nuclear- and chemical-weapons free corridors and zones of trust and security are solid building blocks for this. We have proposed corresponding projects. Their realization, along with that of the zones proposed for Northern Europe and the Balkans, would be suitable for promoting a further reduction in military confrontation in Europe and to favor global solutions.

Erich Honecker stated that we assign extraordinary significance to the conclusion as quickly as possible of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting with a balanced and substantial concluding document. The path will thereby be opened for negotiations on conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals, as well as on further measures to build up trust and security. New fields could be opened up for European cooperation.

The friendship between the Yugoslav and GDR peoples is deeply rooted in the common struggles of the German and Yugoslav working classes against capitalist exploitation, fascism, and war. Today between both socialist states there is close friendship and multifaceted cooperation. Supported on a solid foundation, cooperation is becoming more and more concrete and effective.

We can rightly say that GDR-SFRY relations are at a high level today and are steadily developing and strengthening the SED Central Committee general secretary stated. Our countries are linked by extensive contacts in politics, the economy, education, culture, science, and sports. With an increasing diversity in the forms and methods of their economic relations, the GDR and the SFRY are realizing a considerable volume of mutual trade. Specialization and cooperation both in production and in research and science have progressed well.

As before, we will find—in the spirit of mutual trust and understanding—solutions for new questions and problems which reflect the interests of the two countries and safeguard the stability and continuity of cooperation.

#### **Initiative's Prospects Viewed**

*LD0812212288 East Berlin Voice of GDR Domestic Service in German 1705 GMT 8 Dec 88*

[“Commentary of the Day” by Willi Piater]

[Text] The GDR welcomes and totally supports the new far-reaching proposals and initiatives which Mikhail Gorbachev has submitted before the United Nations, according to Erich Honecker after Gorbachev's speech.

The GDR is actively developing the Warsaw Pact states' peace program, which is aimed at comprehensive and total disarmament, and which makes no detour around any type of weapon. There is no question of our needing a period to think: We have always supported moving

from zero solution to zero solution in word and deed, by the USSR's side and on our own responsibility. For this reason, the announcement that the Soviet Union will, over the next 2 years, in coordination with her allies, be reducing armed forces by 500,000 men and be withdrawing six tank divisions from the GDR, the CSSR, and Hungary, has been the subject of tribute on our part as an event of historical significance.

Participants in the General Assembly said yesterday that it was necessary to think back for a long time in order to remember a speech of similar importance before this audience. Journalists spoke of a drumroll—quite a correct description and not an exaggeration, since the Soviet measures were announced, almost 1 year to the day after the signing of the remarkable INF agreement, as a decision by the USSR Government. This is even more remarkable because the opponents of further disarmament steps, particularly in NATO, had massively stepped up their campaigns to mislead the public. For God's sake, don't do away with nuclear weapons—this would endanger peace, said NATO Secretary General Woerner, whenever there was a chance to do so.

Bonn had evidently approved of the devious trick, misleadingly described as modernization, of replacing short range nuclear weapons by quasi-intermediate range missiles. Why else, during yesterday's Bundestag question time, would the unambiguous No demanded by the majority of the FRG's population have been avoided? The shorter the ranges, the more Germans will be among the victims—a remark by CDU/CSU group chairman Dregger. Has he perhaps already forgotten that himself? Defense Minister Scholz was recently in the United States; if one follows his relieved remarks, the most important result of his visit was the assurance from Washington that troops would not be withdrawn from Bavaria or the Palatinate. What now, Herr Scholz?

Yes, the decision by the Soviet Government is a drumroll, particularly for those who still try to spread the ancient lie of the threat from the East, who still aim for an arms race, in order to please certain groups of large-scale capitalism. Within the next 2 years, half a million Soviet soldiers will take off their uniforms. This is disarmament with no if's or but's, disarmament in action—and it is happening unilaterally, with no advance requirements imposed on the other side and independently of the course of the negotiations in Vienna.

In Moscow, precise account has been taken of the fact that NATO'S military superiority, for example as regards combat aircraft or sea-based arms systems, continues to exist. But we make no progress with the reduction of tensions if no new and bold paths into the future are sought and above all trodden. With the level of technology today, no war can be waged any more on our European continent, even a conventional one. In its time, during the moratorium of over a year on tests of nuclear mass destruction weapons, the Soviet example

did not meet with the requisite positive response. Fortunately, some things have gone better now, particularly since the fight for more security has for a long time now not been simply left to the diplomats alone and because the incessant efforts of the socialist countries not to allow a pause in the disarmament process fall increasingly on fertile ground, as opinion polls repeatedly confirm. The NATO Council today begins its fall meeting in Brussels—the opportunity to let appropriate deeds follow the Soviet example. For now, deeds are called for—in all our interests.

#### **Kessler on Initiative**

*LD0912134488 East Berlin ADN International Service  
in German 0852 GMT 9 Dec 88*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The far-reaching initiatives submitted at the UN General Assembly by Mikhail Gorbachev for the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe, and the declared readiness of the alliance of socialist states to undertake both bilateral, coordinated reductions and unilateral steps as prior concessions will once again lend strong impetus to the process of continuing disarmament and detente. This assessment was made by Defense Minister Army General Heinz Kessler during a visit to a GDR People's Navy unit, according to a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND correspondent's report on Friday.

"At the same time we know that, however pressing it is to intensify efforts in this direction, and however determined the socialist states press in this direction, it nevertheless remains necessary to ensure in all spheres of our national defense and, above all the armed forces and frontier troops of the GDR, that an appropriate, secure military defense of peace and socialism remains guaranteed at all times, as proclaimed to all the world in the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states", NEUES DEUTSCHLAND cites the minister as saying.

Army General Kessler said that it is the experience of the socialist states that negotiations with capitalist partners, which after all always put forward their class positions, are most likely to lead to effective results when these partners are approached from the basis of an economically sound, politically and ideologically solid, and reliably protected socialist order.

#### **Defense Committee Meets on CSCE Process**

*LD0912165988 East Berlin ADN International Service  
in German 1403 GMT 9 Dec 88*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The National Defense Committee of the GDR People's Chamber met today under the leadership of its chairman Deputy Wolfgang Herger. In the consultations, State Secretary Dr Herbert Krolikowski, the first deputy foreign minister, gave a briefing on the state of preparations for new disarmament negotiations within the framework of the CSCE process. He stressed that the measures announced by Mikhail Gorbachev for a unilateral reduction of Soviet Armed Forces

and conventional armaments have great significance and are of great value for the efforts of the Warsaw Pact states to achieve a mandate at the Vienna CSCE meeting for negotiations on conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals.

This step was in line with the unanimous assessment of the Warsaw Pact states that after the start was made on nuclear disarmament with the INF Treaty, a reduction of conventional military potential became a key element in the further disarmament process in the shaping of European security. Comprehensive and intensive preparations were made for forthcoming negotiations within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. It was now a matter of concluding the Vienna CSCE meeting as quickly as possible with a substantial and balanced final document so that negotiations between the 23 member states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO on conventional disarmament in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals and negotiations by all 35 CSCE states on new far-reaching confidence- and security-building measure could begin.

Krolikowski stressed that the GDR would continue in the future to promote the forthcoming negotiations through the further unfolding of its initiatives for a nuclear weapons-free corridor, a chemical weapons-free zone, and a zone of confidence and security in central Europe.

On behalf of the committee, Chairman Wolfgang Herger welcomed the latest initiatives of the USSR at the United Nations. He said that these proposals, coordinated with the GDR, are in the interests of mankind and are in line with our striving not to allow any delay in the disarmament process and to establish the military-strategic balance at ever lower levels. Herger assessed the steadfast efforts of the GDR, at the side of the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact states, for the strengthening and protection of socialism as an expression of its policy aimed at peace, detente and disarmament. This was also its special responsibility, so that war will never again emanate from German soil, rather, only peace.

The agenda of the committee meeting also included a discussion of the draft laws on the 1989 economic plan and state budget plan. The deputies endorsed the drafts.

#### **Hungary**

#### **Kotai Speaks on Disarmament at Rome Conference**

*LD0112230988 Budapest MTI in English  
2128 GMT 1 Dec 88*

[Text] Rome, December 1 (MTI)—Geza Kotai, member of the Central Committee of the HSWP and head of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Central Committee, delivered an address at the International Conference on Conventional Disarmament in Europe in Rome. Mr Kotai touched upon the issue of unilateral measures, which are crucial points in the reduction of conventional

armaments. 'We are not impatient: We are willing to wait for armed forces to be reduced in Hungary as a result of East-West negotiations,' he said. 'At the same time, we are of the opinion that unilateral measures are insufficient to resolve the problems of disarmament, but they may help advance progress. Should they become reciprocal, they would make even more sense. This would also reflect the sincerity of the intention for agreement of both parties.'

Mr Kotai briefed the participants on Hungary's approach to and plans for conventional disarmament. He raised the point that should the planned experts' talks get stuck, talks with the participation of 23 countries (Warsaw Treaty and NATO member states) or of 35 countries (Helsinki follow-up participants) should be convened to tackle the difficulties. He also said the intricate agreements on disarmament which apply to Europe should be tested in a 'model experiment' that does not affect the equilibrium of conventional forces between the East and West.

Finally, Mr Kotai underlined that, 'The reduction of conventional armaments is so complex that it requires the elaboration of new negotiating methods. It is obvious that genuine talks must start by comparing armed forces. Experience shows that owing to qualitative discrepancies, the exchange of data is not enough in itself. This is why it would be important for the exchange of data to be preceded by the working out of a system of criteria that enables the parties to compare quality and quantity. Should the political will be there, this method could spare us from a great number of difficulties later,' Mr Kotai pointed out, adding that Hungary's political will could be taken as read.

#### **Hungarian Officials Comment on Gorbachev Offer**

##### **Karpati Speaks for Defense Ministry**

*LD0812225688 Budapest MTI in English  
2108 GMT 8 Dec 88*

[Text] Budapest, December 8 (MTI)—The latest sensation of world politics was a recurring theme on Thursday at the session of the Defence Committee of the Hungarian National Assembly, held in Nagyatad. The announcement of Mikhail Gorbachev on Wednesday about the unilateral reduction of Soviet troops stationed in the European Socialist countries was linked to the theme discussed by committee—the draft defence budget for 1989—in several major respects.

Colonel-General Ferenc Karpati, minister of defence, in his verbal addendum to the detailed draft submitted for the first time, appreciated the Soviet step as a decision that coincides with the Hungarian efforts. Among the fundamental aspects for planning the military expenditures, he first mentioned the international military-political situation. Following the former favourable changes, the current announcement is a development that occasions hope in the matter of the larger-scale

reduction of European conventional weapons. If NATO responds positively both in words and deeds, then the Vienna talks in progress on this theme, which also directly concern Hungary, could be accelerated and lead to results within the foreseeable future. The minister of defence stressed that with this unilateral step the Soviet Union has also made it unanimous that the presence of its troops is based exclusively on military considerations, thus their withdrawal and disbanding is only dependent on the changes of the European military situation.

All this is essential for Hungary also because the other determining factor of military expenditure, the country's economic and social situation, also justify reducing the budget. The sum to be turned to the maintenance and development of the people's army is expected to increase in nominal value by 1,100 million forints as compared to the actually utilized 38,600 million forints in 1988, but it will drop by 17 per cent in real value. In the interest of a more austere economy, the fundamental proportions of the military expenditures were considerably modified this year. Developments received 32 per cent of the total sum and maintenance 68 per cent. The draft for next year calculates with a 16 per cent share for development inputs.

The minister said that the Ministry of Defence has been reorganized and its staff reduced by about 240 persons. Similar steps will also be taken next year in the border institutions of the army.

Discussing other current tasks, Mr Karpati said working out the bill on alternative military service is progressing at a good pace, and it is expected to be submitted to parliament next year.

In the following debate, many questions were asked on the partial withdrawal of Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Hungary. Mr Karpati said that the decision was coordinated in advance by the Warsaw Treaty member states on a high level. With respect to the degree, the reduction with Hungary is some 25 per cent, which is to be carried out over the next two years. The Soviet units to be withdrawn will not, under any circumstance, be replaced by Hungarian troops, and therefore defence expenditures will not be increased. The Ministry of Defence are to be responsible for the utilization of the barracks and other facilities to be vacated in the given time.

In answer to a question on the degree of Hungary's contribution to the maintenance of the Soviet troops, the minister of defence said that Hungary has no financial obligations. The value of goods delivered for the supply of the troops, and the services they utilize is refunded as for exports.

### **Gyula Horn Assesses Impact**

*LD0812203788 Budapest Television Service  
in Hungarian 1830 GMT 8 Dec 88*

[Interview with State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Gyula Horn by unidentified presenter]

[Text] [Presenter] Gorbachev's UN speech contained many important and interesting foreign political statements, some of which affect us, Hungarians, particularly closely. Our guest is State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Gyula Horn. I think the most important question is the announcement by Gorbachev relating to Soviet force reductions. Does this provide Hungarian foreign policy with a greater scope for maneuvers?

[Horn] Yes, certainly. After all, this is the first time in decades that the Soviet Union has undertaken a unilateral obligation, a gesture, for a significant reduction in its conventional forces. This is the first time this has happened in 40 years. This is very important also from the aspect that when nuclear disarmament was discussed, the West always put it as a demand that the number of nuclear bombs, the number of missiles, could not be reduced without reducing the quantitative advantage of the Warsaw Pact in the conventional weapon sphere. This announcement by Gorbachev creates an entirely new situation from this point of view, in my judgement. It also creates an entirely new negotiating position in the conventional weapons sphere. Because on a whole range of issues, reducing the number of troops concentrated in Central Europe, or the Soviet forces in the Western parts of the Soviet Union, or in Mongolia, along the Soviet-Chinese border—all these significantly change the negotiating position. It is obvious that this will make our situation significantly easier as well.

[Presenter] It has also evoked great interest in that, according to Gorbachev's announcement, more and more capacity, energy and, I should think, brains, will be transferred from the military industry to peaceful, civilian production. How far will this provide an example for the other socialist countries?

[Horn] This is an old problem, from two aspects. One of these is that it is in the fundamental interest of all of us to reduce military expenditures. This is very closely connected with the economy. Thus, if military production drops as a proportion of industrial production in the economy, this eases our situation greatly. Second, what is also very important is that the scientific-technical achievements in the military sphere must be used as soon as possible in civilian life. Thus, in this sense everything that represents an advance in this sphere in the Soviet Union, eases our situation greatly as well.

### **Kotai 'Welcomes' Initiative**

*LD0812201088 Budapest MTI In English  
1816 GMT 8 Dec 88*

[Text] Budapest, December 8 (MTI)—The large-scale, unilateral Soviet arms restriction measures announced by Mikhail Gorbachev at the U.N. General Assembly

were discussed by Geza Kotai, head of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee, in an interview with MTI.

'The unilateral Soviet Armed Forces and arms reduction is a major step in the practical implementation of the new Soviet foreign political policy, and part of the new Soviet security policy conception. It reflects the political intention to break down the former picture of the enemy, and to create a new, constructive partner picture on the global scale and particularly in Europe.

'Alongside its political importance, the military aspects of the announcement are also considerable as, in totality, they reduce the number of the Soviet Army by 500,000. This is of considerable importance from the aspect of intensifying European peace and security, and the further strengthening of confidence between the European countries.

'We welcome this Soviet initiative as Hungary is interested in being a participant already of the first stage of reductions, as was stressed by Karoly Grosz, the general secretary of our party on several occasions. Hungarian foreign policy, continuously consulting with the member states of the Warsaw Treaty and mainly with its most important ally, the Soviet Union, has endeavoured for a long time to moderate European opposition, and to reduce arms and armed forces. In this respect, we ourselves have made several practical initiatives within our alliance system.

'The reduction to be realized continuously over two years considerably affects the units of the Soviet Southern Army Group stationed in the GDR, Czechoslovakia and in our country. According to the published data, 50,000 Soviet troops, 5,000 tanks, furthermore artillery guns and battle machines are to be withdrawn from these three member states of the Warsaw Treaty. It is obvious that the member states of the Warsaw Treaty have already coordinated the fundamental conception. However, further consultations will be held with respect to the detailed time-table, the means of implementation and other data.

'We hope that the NATO member states, our Western European partners will suitably evaluate this unilateral Soviet step, and that they also will take actions in the interest that the asymmetries that came into existence in Europe historically be eliminated as soon as possible, with reciprocally taken unilateral steps', Mr Kotai stressed in the interview with MTI.

### **Pozsgay on Significance of Speech**

*LD0812165188 Budapest MTI in English  
1540 GMT 8 Dec 88.*

[Text] Budapest, December 8 (MTI)—'Austria-Hungry - example of a neighbourhood in Europe'. This is the title of a two-day Hungaro-Austrian symposium that opened in Budapest on Thursday.

The event, co-hosted by the Budapest Austrian Cultural Centre and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, was addressed by Imre Pozsgay, minister of state and member of the Political Committee of the HSWP. In his address, entitled 'Hungry at the end of the 20th century', he gave an account of Hungarian political and economic endeavours. The lectures on the first day of the conference will be given by Dr Heinrich Neisser, minister of the Federal Chancellery, and several Hungarian university professors. Tomorrow, the conference will continue with a debate featuring the following university teachers: Dr Zdenek Mlynar (Austria), Antonin Liehm (France), Dr Viktor Meier (Switzerland), Aleksander Gieysztor (Poland), Dejan Medakovic (Yugoslavia) and Paolo Santarangei (Italy).

In his address, Mr Pozsgay said that the unity of central Europeanism and pan-Europeanism was the common heritage of Hungary and Austria, which enabled the two peoples to do away with separatedness and the 'logic of blocs', and it also provided the basis for dialogue. Following the Second World War, Hungary adopted a programme of modernization and catching up, which was still not complete in 1988. As regards the past 40 years, not only the results had to be looked at, including the abolition of the old social structure, but also the mistakes, which had to be eradicated.

'Mr Gorbachev's speech in New York yesterday gives tremendous support to what I am talking about. I think the underlying significance of the announcement lies not in the disarmament gestures, though their importance is great, but in the fact that it worded the new strategy and philosophy of international coexistence'.

The turnabout in Hungary in May, said Mr Pozsgay, made it clear that without political reform, economic reform could not be implemented, and the rise of the nation reached. Starting from this recognition, the Hungarian Government worked out new bills and legal regulations. A new constitution was needed, providing safeguards for human rights. Social institutions had to be established on the principle of power-division which safeguard the rights of citizens.

In future the scope of the state's activity will be confined to the service of the public making use of state ownership.

The crisis in Hungary is largely due to the past's obsolete model which brought about a fall in productivity, did not enable the use of technical and scientific achievements, and curtailed the direct domestic market contacts between producers and customers to a minimum which led to producers losing interest in production.

In conclusion Imre Pozsgay pointed out that 'the political and economic reform currently underway in Hungary is linked to Austria in so far as we are searching for new forms of cooperation with which we can join the common European institutions.'

### Defense Committee Comments

*LD0812124088 Budapest Domestic Service  
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 8 Dec 88*

[Text] Statistics have been given on the partial Soviet troop withdrawals from Hungary at the session of the National Assembly's Defense Committee in Nagyatad. Attila Balint reports:

[Words indistinct] The deputies received the draft budget for next year in three versions. The real value of defense expenditures decreases considerably in every version. The difference is 7 percent, so the question is whether we will subtract 10 or 17 percent, in real value, from defense. I believe that this will be one of the main questions here in the debate of the National Assembly's Defense Committee in the Nagyatad Culture House, where at this moment the deputies are listening to Colonel-General Ferenc Karpati, defense minister, who is justifying and explaining next year's defense budget.

The minister referred to Gorbachev's announcement yesterday, and he said that this gives further impetus to a substantive commencing of talks on European conventional weapons and to a realization of troop reductions. We await NATO's similar measure in reply, Ferenc Karpati said, and he added that in this manner the process can be accelerated which can avert the obstacles in front of a complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian territory. We think, said the minister, that the current measures could affect one-quarter of Soviet troops in Hungary.

Allow me to cite two figures to give an idea (?regarding) the structure and composition of our country's defense expenditures. In 1988, altogether 32 percent of expenditures was devoted to development and the rest to maintenance; in 1989 this proportion will decrease to 16 percent. This structure is an unhealthy distortion, but the economy, the country's capacity to bear burdens, does not enable anything else, and the Army leadership is also compelled to look at this. Thus, it must renounce, or defer until later, the procurement of numerous technical tools.

We also have heard from Ferenc Karpati that fewer reserves are being called up, 40 percent next year [word indistinct], and in accordance with this, less technology, for example fewer trucks will be taken away from people's economic work. Exercises will be organized more thriftily and more rationally, as regards numbers, size, and frequency alike.

### Military Expert Interviewed

*LD0812143088 Budapest Domestic Service  
in Hungarian 0545 GMT 8 Dec 88*

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Since yesterday the world's radios, and ours as well, have been reporting and commenting on the news, particularly, the announcement by Mikhail Gorbachev that the USSR will unilaterally

reduce, in 2 years, its conventional armed forces by half a million. This affects Eastern Europe, the European areas of the Soviet Union, and Mongolia. [passage omitted] Jozsef P. Szabo has interviewed Gyeorgy Szentesi.

[Begin recording] [Szabo] What do you, the military expert, consider to be the most important aspect of Gorbachev's announcements?

[Szentesi] First and foremost, that the Soviet Union has proved that there exists an endeavor for a sensible (?sufficiency) in the sphere of conventional weapons, as well. It can be established that in Europe, the asymmetry existing in the sphere of conventional weapons, that is—the superiority existing in certain spheres on both sides cannot be used, first and foremost because there is no danger of war at present. I am convinced that the current Soviet leadership is also of the view that at present, neither NATO, nor the Warsaw Pact, have an offensive objective.

The other aspect, which I consider to be extremely important, is that this should be interpreted as a significant step aimed at coordinating the declarative political aspect and the military-technological aspect of the Warsaw Pact's military doctrine. The declarative political aspect of military doctrine is unequivocally defensive in nature, thus we state that we do not want to attack anyone, we shall not start war, we shall not occupy foreign areas. At the same time, the armed forces available as a background to this do not preclude the possibility of attack. This position of an offensive nature is now considerably lessened by the enormous disarmament step, which affects both force numbers and weapons.

It can be said that all this seriously foreshadows the possibility of creating a structural offensive incapability, that is—the military doctrine's declarative and military-technological aspect being in full agreement.

[Szabo] Half a million soldiers, or 800 tanks [harci gep]-these are striking statistics for the public today. However, how many are there here, facing one another, in the European region?

[Szentesi] Precise figures cannot be given on this, since neither we, nor NATO, have made them public. According to suppositions, these 500,000 people amount to 25 percent of the entire strength of the Soviet landforces, and 10,000 tanks amount to roughly 25 percent of the total stock of tanks. Although I say that, the figures are not precise.

[Szabo] American reactions, and reaction in the world, have been very favorable. Nevertheless, I heard in one of Secretary of State Shultz's statements that the Gorbachev announcement is significant, the Soviet armed force reduction is significant, but there remain considerable asymmetries.

[Szentesi] Naturally, and not only on our side, but on NATO's side as well. The asymmetry is two-sided, since both sides developed their armed forces differently, they developed differently their land forces and the other kinds of armed forces—the air force and the navy, as well. I have to say, sincerely, that NATO has a considerable superiority in these latter spheres.

[Szabo] So I can interpret this as: In spite of our making reductions in certain spheres where we had a superiority, there are still asymmetries in these same spheres.

[Szentesi] There may conceivably remain asymmetry, but since there is asymmetry in other spheres on the other side, these asymmetries may not only be eliminated as the result of the next talks, but after the elimination of asymmetries, perhaps it may be possible to go even lower in the level of armed forces weapons.

[Szabo] In his radio statement, Geza Kotai, head of the Central Committee Foreign Affairs Department, said that the Soviet military force reduction first would affect the GDR, then Czechoslovakia, and finally Hungary—in this sequence. The French news agency, AFP, taking NATO's statistics as its basis, says that by this, the strength of Soviet soldiers in the affected areas would decrease by one-quarter.

[Szentesi] I can neither confirm, nor refute, the French news agency's statistic, because we only know precisely the size of the strength of Soviet Armed Forces stationed in Hungary. As Janos Kadar has said, this is 62,000 men. Regarding what proportion of this will be withdrawn, obviously we will get precise information on this in the course of reduction, and obviously, when the Warsaw Pact and NATO exchange the statistics of their armed forces and weapons.

[Szabo] What impact will the Gorbachev announcements have on future disarmament talks?

[Szentesi] My conviction is that they will considerably advance conventional armed force and weapons reductions, and they will create a basis for the all-European armed force and weapons reduction talks that get underway in the wake of the successful conclusion of the Vienna follow-up talks which is absolutely necessary for the reductions being successfully carried out. [end recording]

#### **Kotai Queried on Proposal**

*LD071222488 Budapest Domestic Service  
in Hungarian 2100 GMT 7 Dec 88*

[Text] [Announcer] A short time after the Gorbachev speech, Jozsef Orosz sought out Geza Kotai, head of the MSZMP Central Committee's Foreign Affairs Department.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Orosz] General Secretary Gorbachev designated three East European countries at the United Nations: Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Hungary. Is it possible to know what concrete effect the arms force reduction will have on Hungary?

[Kotai] If we take into consideration current European military security forces relations, then in my view the three times one-third proportion is not justified and just. In my estimation this should perhaps affect the GDR a little more—but this is only my assumption—to a smaller degree Czechoslovakia and I put our country in third place. In any event the target is of such magnitude that even in regard to Hungary these reductions will be considerable.

[Orosz] When will they begin?

[Kotai] This will take place within 2 years. This will be a process and not a step that will occur within 3, 4 days, or 1 or 2 weeks.

[Orosz] Following Gorbachev's announcement, in what way will the European balance of forces change?

[Kotai] According to the data which are known at present, there are considerable asymmetries, in certain areas to the advantage of the NATO or the West European countries; and in certain areas to the advantage of our countries, the member states of the Warsaw Pact. This unilateral step, announced by the Soviet Union, will reduce the asymmetries where we have a certain superiority. It is obvious that this is a very important, a very significant, a repeated Soviet political gesture in the field of unilateral reductions. We very much hope, as we have also voiced many times, that our Western partners and the NATO partner states will respond constructively to this initiative and that they will take measures for making reductions where they have superiority, for example, in respect to fighter bombers or combat helicopters. [end recording]

#### **Official Statements Issued on Military Spending Cuts**

**Karpati on Soviet Cuts, Defense Budget Cuts**  
*LD0812191588 Budapest Domestic Service*  
*in Hungarian 1730 GMT 8 Dec 88*

[Text] [Presenter] It is obviously connected with the Gorbachev announcement, that in the National Assembly's Defense Committee session the reduction of the number of Soviet troops stationed in our country was also raised. Attila Balint's conversation with Defense Minister Ferenc Karpati was recorded in Nagyatad:

[Begin recording] [Balint] The Defense Ministry's budget will be reduced in real value terms by 17 percent. What does this mean?

[Karpati] Not only I but others also think that the country's defense is strong if the economy is strong, too. If the situation now demands that we renounce certain things in the interest of being able to realize the objectives which the government adopted last year, in its stabilization and unfolding program, then even with (?difficulty) we too must take account of this.

[Balint] The deputies here have been given the draft budget in two variations. The difference between the two was 7 percent. According to the one, if I remember correctly, the amount which the Defense Ministry would get this year is a little over 38 billion....

[Karpati, Interrupting] Yes.

[Balint] According to the other one it would be 42. But you have said that you do not consider it probable that the latter would happen.

[Karpati] I know about the debate that has been conducted in the government. For this reason I have unequivocally presented this variation to the Defense Committee, since more probably than not it is this one that will be approved.

[Balint] You are taking a series of measures to try to make up the amount of money which you will not be getting. One of these for example, is that next year the number of reserves, the reserves which may be called up, will be reduced by 40 percent. And what else?

[Karpati] It is not just a measure of thrift that the reserves will be reduced so considerably. But it is also pertinent that—even if not to such a proportion—nonetheless a significantly smaller amount will be utilized from the national economy, including the (?restricted use) of various machines [munkagepek], vehicles [gépművek], and other technical tools, during maneuvers.

[Balint] You mentioned here the Gorbachev proposals from yesterday, and first of all you stated that as a consequence of these proposals the Hungarian People's Army does not have any obligations [kötelezettségek], so to speak, so the military strength [hadiletszám] does not have to be increased here.

[Karpati] These were not proposals; these are unilateral decisions, steps, which Comrade Gorbachev announced at the UN General Assembly. We judge our Hungarian situation, our tasks, as follows: That we can fulfil them completely.

[Balint] You have said that this will now affect about one quarter of the Soviet Military Forces stationed in Hungary.

[Karpati] It was not the first time that it has been said, by the Soviet Government in fact, that its objective is that in Europe by the year 2000 all foreign troops should be withdrawn from the territories of other countries. But this cannot be unilateral.

[Balint] It was raised here in the debate of the parliament committee that the significant reduction of your budget will not fail to have an effect on production, on the functioning of those enterprises which have first and foremost been delivering military orders.

[Karpati] This is unfortunately the case. It is not possible everywhere to switch over very quickly and suddenly. Many people will also be affected, so much that their work places might cease. [end recording]

### **Military Budget Cuts Outlined**

*LD0812200088 Budapest Television Service  
in Hungarian 1830 GMT 8 Dec 88*

[Text] The National Assembly Defense Committee held a budget session in Nagyatad today. Our Zalaegerszeg reporter (Gabor Halasi) reports:

The deputies were given 15 minutes to study the written material distributed to them. As the openness of the session did not at the same time mean the openness of the statistical data, journalists had to be content with the fact that in 1989 our country's defense expenditures will further decrease. Defense Minister Ferenc Karpati gave only the following verbal supplement: With regard to the country's economic situation, the armed forces have been obliged to relinquish 4.9 billion forints.

In 1989 the largest proportion of the military budget will be spent on maintenance, and only a smaller proportion on development. Further inner reserves will be uncovered; the number of maneuvers will be decreased; fewer reserves will be conscripted; organizational reconstruction will be implemented. All this will naturally not be at the expense of training.

Now the issues affecting those eligible for military service: By next year they will not call up those awaiting entrance to higher education institutes, but university and college students will receive 1 year of training after graduation. The length of the so-called unarmed service is expected to be 24 months, and that of civilian service 36 months.

### **Official Response to Gorbachev's UN Speech**

#### **Assembly Committee Praises Gorbachev Troop Cuts**

*LD0912222388 Budapest MTI in English  
2100 GMT 9 Dec 88*

[Text] Budapest, December 9 (MTI)—At its session on Friday [9 December] in Budapest, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian National Assembly welcomed the announcement of Mikhail Gorbachev made

in New York on the unilateral Soviet reduction of armed forces. It noted with satisfaction that the planned reduction will also affect the area of Hungary.

In its position, the committee, which met under the chairmanship of Matyas Szuros, evaluated the Soviet initiative as a world political act of historical importance. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly considers the armed forces reduction announcement to be the practical implementation of the new foreign political way of thinking and new military policy conception of the Soviet Union. With regard to the tragic reports on the Armenian earthquake, the Foreign Affairs Committee voiced its sincere sympathy for the relatives of the victims and the Armenian nation, and assured the people of friendly solidarity.

The committee gave recognition to the Foreign Ministry for its work. The Foreign Affairs Committee approved the draft of the ministry's budget for 1989, in spite of the fact that severe austerity included could obstruct the efficient operation of the ministry. The Foreign Ministry calculates with budgetary support of some 2,000 million forints and plans its revenues to total more than 1,500 million forints. This means that the sum of support will be 17.1 per cent higher than this year's level, and revenues 19.3 per cent more.

The ministry mainly intends to increase its revenues by raising the price of visa issuing by 50 per cent. (In general, a Hungarian visa costs the equivalent of 10 dollars). With respect to reducing expenditure, the reduction of foreign representations may be considered.

The Foreign Affairs Committee holds it necessary to rationalize and better coordinate the foreign information about Hungary between institutions.

Mr Szuros reported that since the last session of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the president of the National Assembly has received a great deal of post about the Hungarians in Transylvania. The correspondents include several voluntarily set up societies and alternative organizations, including the Hungarian Democratic Forum. These organizations have offered the participation of their experts. The Foreign Affairs Committee considers the initiative worthy of appreciation and pointed out that an important task of Hungarian legislation is to formulate a good law on minorities.

### **Gyula Horn Welcomes Proposals**

*LD1012185588 Budapest MTI in English  
1638 GMT 10 Dec 88*

[Text] Budapest, December 10 (MTI)—Saturday's [10 December] edition of the Hungarian newspaper "NEPS-ZABADSAG" carries an interview with Gyula Horn, state secretary for foreign affairs, on the unilateral Soviet arms reduction measures announced by Mikhail Gorbachev in New York and their international significance.



Mr Horn states that, "We can welcome this extremely important Soviet initiative because on the one hand it reflects the new Soviet political thinking in practice, and on the other this disarmament move, taken in coordination with the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, concerns mainly the European region including the conventional forces deployed in Hungary. Under the plan, 500,000 troops are to be demobilized over two years, that is, the Soviet Union is to cut its land forces by one quarter without demanding similar moves from the other side. The reduction of armoured troops and artillery, in other words, offensive armaments, is a significant step in the elimination of discrepancies. Discrepancies, however, can be found on both sides, and I think that, though the measures I have just mentioned are unilateral, it would increase confidence and pave the way for an agreement on disarmament if NATO were to follow suit. It is well established that the upward movement of the arms race is ignited by a series of moves and counter-moves. It would be good if the other side would follow the Soviet example. Here I'm thinking of certain categories of the navy and air force, the reduction of the armed forces of NATO and cutting back on its offensive capacities.

"Though Mikhail Gorbachev did not refer to the Vienna follow-up when he announced the unilateral move, I am convinced that the withdrawal of 50,000 troops from Hungary, the GDR and Czechoslovakia will make a benevolent impact on the Vienna talks and contribute to giving a mandate to the disarmament talks and speed up the whole process."

"The Warsaw Treaty Organization already proposed at its Budapest meeting in 1986, as well as this year in Warsaw, that the number of armies be cut by one third in the nineties. Those proposals envisaged the establishment of the defensive character of the armies only in the third phase. Now the Soviet Union is approaching this target, not in a symmetric, but in a unilateral way. I think it goes without saying that this fact alters the BS [as received] that have to be taken into consideration at the forthcoming talks. It would be a big help if the mutually coordinated exchange of data started as soon as possible. This is hindered by the fact that the two parties assess the forces of the other side in a different way. NATO, for example, has recently made public a survey in which, in certain categories, the Warsaw Treaty Organization has a 3-to-1 edge. We cannot accept this because, besides the numbers, the qualitative side must also be taken into calculation. At the same time, the London-based Institute for Strategic Studies accepts a much smaller Warsaw Treaty edge, as does the U.S. Senate's Committee [words indistinct]. It shows that the other side is not homogeneous as regards power relations.

"The Soviet Union will cut its forces deployed in Hungary, the GDR and Czechoslovakia by 50,000 troops, about 20 per cent. 62,000 Soviet troops are stationed in Hungary, and this figure is to be cut by 25 per cent. Exact figures will be worked out in the weeks and months to

come. The order for withdrawal will be worked out following a coordination of the parties concerned. The political decision has been taken, the implementation requires preparations.

"The Soviet decision reconfirms our earlier view that Hungary may be in the first stage of an arms and armaments reduction. The issue has been raised both at bilateral and multilateral talks several times. It is especially important for us, because significant military troops and armaments are concentrated in the region in which Hungary lies. The Soviet Union also agrees with the Hungarian demand that the country belong to the zone designated for arms reduction".

#### **Editorial on Gorbachev Proposals**

*AU0912160188 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG  
in Hungarian 8 Dec 88 p 1*

[Editorial by Peter Vajda: "The Gorbachev Package"]

[Text] There are still more than 2 weeks until the winter holidays, but we have already received a preliminary present whose place is under our common Christmas tree. The Soviet "disarmament package" serves peace, and not only in general terms, because Mikhail Gorbachev's UN speech did not include a single sentence of general-propagandistic rhetoric. This is important because peace has been the most widely discussed issue in the United Nations since its inception, while mankind has often found itself nearing the brink of war.

Reserves give value to money, and deeds give credit to words. The speech heard in New York on 7 December proved with facts that restructuring permeated foreign policy thinking without any taboos. The main motive of this new way of thinking is that attention should be focused on the common tasks facing mankind, and the security of states and social orders cannot be based on weapons. Superiority—not for anyone—can be no guarantee, because real security and security policies are too important a matter to be based on military considerations. As for the image of the enemy on the alert, in which people on both sides had believed, this has in 1988 been turned into a fantasy. A self-example could be the best tool for replacing this fantasy with the image of a friend and partner. Such an example is shown by the Soviet Union in the decision recently announced by Mikhail Gorbachev. In 2 years, the Soviet Armed Forces will be cut by 500,000 soldiers and 10,000 armored vehicles in Europe. This is a real, not a symbolic, reduction, a step which even if nothing is dependent on it, justly expects a return measure. In agreement with Hungary, the CSSR, and the GDR, six Soviet tank divisions will have been removed from these countries by 1991. As for armored vehicles, one cannot deny the fact that these are frightening military devices particularly capable of attack, and that the Soviet Army has an advantage in the number of such machines. Thus, this decision demonstrates that the current Soviet leadership, which is thinking in global terms, is wise and brave

enough to give up this advantage. Other kinds of offensive weapons will also be withdrawn, and the structure of the remaining Soviet troops will be changed to make it absolutely clear that there is neither the intention nor the capacity to launch an attack. This will mark a dramatic change compared with the current situation.

Part of the 50,000 soldiers and 5,000 tanks to be withdrawn from the aforementioned three countries will leave Hungarian territory. This will represent a step in the direction that has been greatly discussed in various forums in Hungary, in accordance with our public feeling and our leaders' efforts. We can now note with deep satisfaction that the spirit of dialogue is gaining ground, a dialogue in which Budapest believed even "during the coldest days." It has been proved that Hungary can also be a testing ground for the reduction of armed forces and armaments in the beginning of this process. All we could wish for is to continue this process and develop it on the basis of fairness, mutualism, and confidence. Yesterday, all this seemed a utopia and an illusion, but today, it is a real possibility. The historic speech in the structure on the bank of the East River has prepared the road leading to this possibility.

### Poland

**Commentary on Gorbachev's UN Speech**  
*AU1212143988 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU*  
*in Polish 8 Dec 88 p 6*

[Commentary by Zygmunt Slomkowski: "Humanism as the Determinant of the Future"]

[Text] What defined the content of the speech that Mikhail Gorbachev delivered at the 43d UN Session were not historical anniversaries, but contemporary needs and human aspirations. However, it was fortuitous that certain anniversaries bore an affinity with widespread concepts of international relations and the creation of a better and safer and more peaceful world.

Mikhail Gorbachev referred to the French Revolution, the October Revolution, as well as the 40th anniversary of the United Nations' adoption of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. There was good reason for this. The main thought contained in Gorbachev's speech at the UN forum was a broadly conceived humanization of the life of societies, peoples, and the entire world community. In light of this, referring to history proved to be exceptionally useful. The French Revolution bore the slogan freedom, equality, and fraternity on its banners. The socialist revolution added the humanist value of liberating man from economic dependence and the hatred produced by war to these slogans. The UN Declaration on Human Rights codified the principles that stress human dignity and the humanist values that apply to international life.

Ideological divisions, the long duration of the arms race, cold war, world war, and regional wars have pushed humanism to the background on many occasions and have reduced its importance as the cornerstone of relations between states and peoples. For humanism to be restored its place of first-rank importance in the creation of present and future relations as well as a view of the whole world, what was needed was new thinking, the fundamental changes that are currently taking place in the Soviet Union and the socialist states, as well as the new assessments that are being made in the West. Gorbachev achieved this by talking about the need to divest relations between states of ideology and militarization.

Gorbachev sees the United Nations Organization as being an institution that—besides, this is line with its vocation—should become the main center for activities aimed at humanizing the future. The issues that he mentioned in his speech, such as a further reduction in weapons, a just solution to the debt problem, the protection of the natural environment, and the prevention and elimination of regional conflicts are becoming urgent challenges for the United Nations. The United Nations Organization, as a forum for equal, sovereign states, has the main role to play in the entire process of fostering world humanism.

In his New York speech, Gorbachev put forward a series of new, concrete Soviet proposals that pave the way to disarmament, and economic and humanitarian dialogue. With respect to Europe, he proposed a further unilateral reduction in Soviet forces and weapons that should help speed up the commencement of a European conference on reducing conventional weapons. In the case of Afghanistan, the Soviet proposal concerned a rapid cessation of all military activities in that country and the use of the United Nations to guarantee the neutrality and peaceful development of that state. In the case of the Middle East, Gorbachev repeated the proposal to call an international conference that should produce a permanent peaceful settlement dictated by the requirements of humanism.

The concrete, practical suggestions made by the Soviet leader at the United Nations are falling on the fertile soil of universal ideas of the world—a planet on which people realize the noble goals of life. For these reasons, Gorbachev's speech has been very warmly welcomed.

### Yugoslavia

**Defense Secretary Speaks on Army Budget, Defense 'Concept'**  
*AU0612164988 Belgrade NARODNA ARMIIJA*  
*in Serbo-Croatian No 2577 1 Dec 88*

[Speech by Colonel General Veljko Kadijevic, federal secretary for national defense, at the session of the SFRY Assembly Federal Chamber in Belgrade on 24 November]

[Text] Consolidating the country's defense and security capability still is, and will long remain, the prerequisite

for its peaceful development. Yugoslavia has opted for the concept of all-people's defense and social self-protection on a lasting basis. The effectiveness of this concept was proved:

(1) During the course of the national liberation war where this concept originated and when it was proved in practice that victory over a powerful military power is possible;

(2) During the entire postwar social buildup, when it successfully deterred any armed aggression against our country, particularly in the case of some critical events, so that we have had the longest period of peace in the recent history of our peoples.

The concept of all-people's defense can successfully respond to all kinds of threats and makes it possible to build up a stable and flexible defense system that can successfully perform four essential defense functions at the same time:

a) Deterring an aggressor both by the country's overall defense capability and by the existence of a contingent of armed forces capable of responding to any assault by an aggressor by an assault that would involve for the aggressor the risk of unacceptable losses. This is a particularly significant factor in countering the latest military doctrines that are primarily directed against small and nonaligned countries.

b) Defeating the aggressor energetically and quickly in the case of an aggression with a limited objective. It is very important here that potential aggressors are aware that our capabilities and orientations are such;

c) In the case of an aggression with a radical objective in which the relation of forces is unfavorable to us and in which the aggressor opts for a quick victory applying modern variants of blitzkrieg, one should prepare oneself to force on the aggressor a prolonged and exhausting war until victory;

d) It offers the possibility of effectively eliminating an emergency situation, that is, of successfully countering the doctrine of low-intensity conflict in all its forms.

A special role within such a concept of defense—a concept based on the complete human and material potential of the country—is played, and special responsibility is borne by, the Armed Forces and particularly the Yugoslav People's Army [YPA], as the offensive and most mobile part of them. It is from such a historical and modern orientation of all-people's defense that the place and role of the YPA, as well as the purpose and directions of its further development result, all of which determines the drafting of the YPA budget.

The trend of the general developments in international relations, particularly in relations between superpowers and military-political blocs, is basically positive. Global

relations in the political sphere are more inclined toward coexistence and cooperation than toward confrontation, although the actual relations will probably be a constant combination of elements of controlled cooperation and controlled confrontation. Regarding the economic sphere, these relations vary from case to case, following the logic of economic interests, as well as having military strategic interest serving as a permanent corrective element that would intervene in both the political and economic relations mentioned above. The primary interest in the military-strategic sphere is to avoid mutual conflict between the superpowers and between blocs. On the whole, relations in all three spheres mentioned above have a positive impact on world peace, which is based more and more on the principles of collective security, and less on the relation of forces. Strategic parity, particularly regarding nuclear forces, continues to be a permanent element of strategic intimidation and deterrence, and is objectively a factor limiting the possibility of a so-called major war.

By withdrawing and destroying the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe, total nuclear potential is reduced by only 4 percent. Even if the present strategic nuclear arsenal is reduced by as much as 50 percent, there would still remain a sufficient quantity for mutual destruction. One should add here the several tens of thousands of tactical nuclear warheads in the armament of several countries, so that there is no doubt that nuclear arms will continue to be the main deterrent in global relations. Therefore, the world will need much more time and effort to ensure universal detente and security, particularly if one considers the fact that there is an increasing number of countries that are improving or producing nuclear weapons, or which possess the technical and technological capability to produce nuclear weapons.

Although the USSR has formulated the "defense sufficiency" doctrine which implies that a country's armed forces should be of such a quantity and quality to preclude either side winning a possible war, the "competition doctrine" that the United States particularly insists on results in the real continuation of the arms race. At the same time, there is the tendency to compensate for any reduction of nuclear or any other weapons by developing new armament systems whereby an adequate parity in the relation of forces is secured and the quality of armaments raised.

#### The Essence of New Conventional Doctrines

Because the role of nuclear weapons lies more and more in the sphere of deterrence and less and less in the sphere of real usage, very intensive work is being done on the development, improvement, and production of new types of non-nuclear weapons through the application of high technology. In their capabilities and effects, these new weapons considerably exceed the present generations of conventional weapons, and some of their characteristics are similar to nuclear combat means. New

conventional military doctrines are being developed on this basis and are realistically much more applicable, particularly against Third World regions and countries. It is a characteristic of these doctrines—the doctrine of in-depth strike, the doctrine of air-land battle, and the doctrine of quick deep penetration—that they further radicalize the strategic blitzkrieg doctrine. I would particularly like to stress that more significance is being attached to the doctrine of low-intensity conflict, which is primarily directed against nonaligned and other developing countries burdened by an unstable internal situation. Countries whose armed forces are insufficiently technically equipped face the increased danger of the so-called stand-off weapons [dejstvo sa distance], because they in fact cannot retaliate against an enemy who uses such weapons offensively. Almost everybody plans to strengthen their armed forces qualitatively with some insignificant quantitative reduction.

Recently, the entire world has been carefully monitoring events in our country. Most countries express an interest in Yugoslavia's stability. Some neighboring and other countries are making various assessments of the possible course of our internal situation. One must not disregard the fact that sudden reverses in the international military-political situation, which can radically change our strategic position, are always possible. Therefore, we must above all see the security of our country as being closely connected to our internal situation, but also to the development of the military-political factor in our region and elsewhere.

#### **The Influence of the Crisis on the Country's Defense Capability**

Two dominant processes are under way in Yugoslavia today with completely opposite ideological and sociopolitical aims and with many different nuances and variants. One of them has the aim of finding the way out of the country's crisis through three reforms and directing its further socialist self-managing social and economic development toward a richer and more humane society, and the other has the aim of destroying Yugoslavia and its socialist self-managing structure.

The current social crisis and its possible further development has a multiple negative effect on society's defense capability and a stressed tendency toward increasing the danger to the country's integrity. The inefficient functioning of the political and legal system, among other things, results in the decrease in the moral strength of society and the Armed Forces. The economic and structural crisis in the country is undermining the material basis of all-people's defense and social self-protection, limiting technological equipping and modernization of the Armed Forces, and has a negative effect on the defense and self-protection consciousness of the population and the members of the Armed Forces.

The different ideopolitical movements in society are bringing about disintegration of the Yugoslav social sphere, provoking national divisions, and contributing to the establishment of some movements in the country that visualize a "third" Yugoslavia, or more precisely, no Yugoslavia, because allegedly everybody is a loser in present Yugoslavia. They also inspire attacks on basic social values, including the YPA, thus reducing the country's defense ability and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. A quasi-democratic climate is being created in which all means are allowed. Partial interests, a feeling of defeatism, and doubts about the prospects of life in common are strengthening in the people's awareness.

Nationalism, as an ideological concept and practical activity, is on the increase in all the parts and activities of society, which is confirmed by the increasing phenomena of national divisions, the provocation of excesses on a national basis, and the encouragement of national exclusiveness and conflicts in daily life. Nationalism is potentially the most dangerous factor for inducing the disintegration of the Armed Forces and it opens up scope for fatal interethnic divisions.

#### **Attacks on the YPA Serve To Destroy Yugoslavia**

The key tasks of the 9th and 16th sessions of the LCY Central Committee on Kosovo are not being implemented. Since the 17th session, activities from the positions of Albanian separatism and nationalism have been intensified, and this was publicly and drastically manifested in recent days. The security of persons and property, and the freedom and rights of citizens, especially Serbs and Montenegrins (and increasingly Albanians who oppose the national-separatist forces) continue to be seriously endangered, and this encourages them to emigrate under duress. At the same time, Serbian and Montenegrin nationalists encourage activities that are not in the interest of the Serbia and Montenegrin people in Kosovo, but objectively serve the interests of the counterrevolution, whose final aim is to break up Yugoslavia.

The attacks on the YPA above all serve to destroy Yugoslavia, and its federal and socialist system. One wants to change the place, role, and nature determined for it by the SFRY Constitution, as well as its place and role established by the concept of all-people's defense. Therefore these attacks are constantly strengthening and are being carried out continuously by means of psychological-propaganda pressure and other overt and covert assaults by the forces of the external and internal enemy, and by means of attempts to compromise its officers, spread defeatism and discourage people from the military vocation, encourage national homogenization within the Armed Forces, advocate illegal group activities within the YPA from the positions of nationalism and separatism, and carry out the crudest forms of subversive activities, terrorism, sabotage, and service to

foreign elements as agents of foreign intelligence services. The attacks on the YPA are also helped by a benevolent and tolerant attitude by some institutions of the political and legal system.

The conviction of the YPA personnel that they perform an honorable and socially responsible task that demands effort and sacrifice, as well as the forsaking of many personal and family pleasures, finds itself daily in sharp conflict with the ruthless insults to personal and institutional dignity, slanders, and malicious suspicions. This fills them with indignation.

The decisions of the 17th LCY Central Committee session, the consistent elaboration of them and making them concrete within the framework of the three reforms, as well as their energetic implementation, mark our correct, democratic way out of the crisis. It is probably precisely for this reason that resistance is appearing to the elaboration and implementation of these decisions. We must energetically eliminate the resistance, whether in the political or economic sphere. The essential prerequisite for this being done according to the norms of democratic society is the efficient functioning of the state at all levels of its existence, its institutions, and its legal system. The current situation in this sphere must be overcome very rapidly and resolutely, because there is a danger that the reforms may be threatened from the very start.

In making decisions about the policy of the further development of the Armed Forces, we always proceed from an objective estimate of the possible ways in which the security of the SFRY could be threatened and of the set-up of the combat means in our theater of war, bearing in mind the very specific relationship of forces, especially the level of the technical equipment of our forces and those of the potential aggressors.

Until the end of the 1985, that is, before the adoption of the current medium-term plan for the development of the YPA, we succeeded in maintaining a tolerable level in the difference between the level of equipment of the YPA and that of the armed forces of the countries with which we compare ourselves, especially in the quantity of individual types of weapons. However, stagnation in the quality of some combat systems was obvious even then.

Proceeding from the most essential operational needs, in the period 1986-90 it is necessary to provide 6.61 percent of the estimated national income to finance the YPA. However, considering the serious economic situation, our main aim was to stop a further widening of differences in relation to the armed forces of the countries with which we compare ourselves. The prerequisite for this were resources to the value of 5.2 percent of the national income whose average annual increase was planned to be at a rate of 3 percent.

It is well-known that the resources that were actually provided for financing the army were considerably less than planned, because the basis on which these were calculated was reduced due to the real fall in national income. Moreover, funds were not provided according to the planned percentage of allocations. Therefore, in 1986 funding amounted to 4.98 percent of national income and in 1987, 4.52 percent. Apart from that, delay in receiving the funds reduced their real value.

In such unfavorable conditions for providing financial resources, we were forced, apart from other things, to make certain changes in our plans and programs:

1. As you know, the SFRY Presidency made the decision to reduce the number of military personnel by 13 percent, which is now being implemented;
2. We have carried out a restructuring of certain forms of spending in favor of technical modernization;
3. As well as this, we were forced to abandon some technical modernization programs and we have had to limit some, and extend the deadline for their realization.

#### **The Fall in Standards and Problems of Business Operations**

The next important consequence of the reduction in the real amount of funds for financing the YPA is a fall in the living standard of army members. Although we have attempted to coordinate its changes with the established policy on standards in society, I must say that the personal incomes of active military personnel and civilians in the YPA have recorded a fall in the last 2 years greater than the fall in real personal incomes in the economy. It has been estimated that this year's fall in the personal incomes of the YPA members will be about 17 percent, which is also the greatest fall so far. The slowed rate of housing construction has also had an unfavorable effect on living standards. Because of general limitations regarding the level of personal incomes and our desire to provide the minimum existence for the youngest officers, there is now in practice a very nonincentive payment system whose essential characteristic is the ratio of 3:1 between the highest and the lowest personal incomes in the YPA. All this has the effect of increasing the drain from the YPA, especially of highly-qualified and able cadres, and reducing people's desire to enter military service. The investigations that we made at the end of 1987 show that the main reasons why people leave active military service are: dissatisfaction with personal incomes, specific conditions and difficulties of the work, burden and responsibility at work, ever slower resolution of the housing problem, frequent transfers, worsened employment possibilities for family members, and so on.

I would particularly point out the unfavorable consequences to which our military industry has been subjected. Changed conditions in business operations in the country and trends in the world market have most

directly caused serious difficulties in this branch of the economy, which employs about 77,000 workers. Its financial position is weak, although the results that have been achieved have been above the average results of the Yugoslav economy.

The latest problems are mainly connected with the inadequate use of capacities and the decrease in production. The present capacities of the military industry were built on the basis of plans and programs for the development of the SFRY Armed Forces in times when 6.17 percent, 5.80 percent, and 5.20 percent of national income was allocated for financing the YPA, and on the basis of an assessment of export possibilities that could involve 30 percent of existing capacities. However, the reduction of resources for financing the YPA and the production of armament and military equipment over a number of years calls into question the employment of a considerable part of military industry capacities.

#### **The Direction of Further Buildup and Improvement of the Armed Forces**

In order to overcome the present difficulties, we have started to draw up a blueprint for the development of every organization of associated labor in special purpose production until the year 2000 and will also undertake a number of measures ranging from restructuring production (according to the plan for the long-term development of the Armed Forces) to mothballing a portion of the production capacities.

The assessment of the situation I have presented points clearly to the conclusion that the aims and tasks of the concept of all-people's defense in maintaining the country's security remain the same. However, the focus must be on strengthening the function of deterring any aggression, because that is the most rational and, under present conditions, a very realistic form of defense. The deterrence function certainly must not be at the expense of other functions, because in the event there is a need to react using one of the other three functions—particularly in the case of an aggression with a radical objective—there will be no time or opportunity to compensate for what was missed during peacetime. There are two essential conditions that must be met for the successful realization of the deterrence function: (1) overall stability in the country and (2) appropriate preparedness, organization, and level of equipment of the Armed Forces, and particularly the YPA, for efficiently countering the modern military doctrines both in the form of preventive activity and in the case of a possible aggression against our country. In order to perform this function, the moral-political fortitude, readiness, and resoluteness of all army personnel are not in themselves sufficient; it is also necessary for the YPA to be technically equipped as well.

The further buildup and modernization of the Armed Forces, and the YPA in particular, will be mainly directed toward the following:

(1) Maintaining and strengthening the moral-political unity of all members of the Armed Forces on the program of preserving and further developing the achievements of the Yugoslav socialist revolution, and particularly of Yugoslav socialist patriotism and Josip Broz Tito's revolutionary thought and work;

(2) The further theoretical and practical buildup and modernization of military doctrine and combat skills in accordance with our needs and possibilities, with innovations in the development of doctrines and military-political aspects of modern armies, as well as with the need to find timely and appropriate answers to all these challenges. As far as is possible, we must compensate for some shortages in the sphere of material-technological aspects of armed struggle and war in general by an additional buildup of our military doctrine;

(3) The additional buildup of the organizational-formation structure of units so that the overall organizational structure of the Armed Forces is adapted even more closely to the conditions and demands for successfully waging all forms of armed struggle, especially the combined form;

(4) The additional buildup of the system of beefing up the Armed Forces with cadres, modernizing combat training and education, as well as promoting military schooling;

(5) Modernizing the system of leadership and command, both in the organizational and functional sense—above all in those segments that ensure even greater unity, cohesion, and maximum utilization of all available resources;

(6) Improving military organization in accordance with the requirements of modern social achievements ranging from data processing to the social consciousness of the young generation.

#### **Inflation Diminishes Already Reduced Funds**

Comrades, in connection with the explanation of the volume of funds for the financing of the YPA in 1989, I do not want to talk about the volume, the concept, or the basis for the drafting of the federal budget, as this was discussed by Comrade Rikanovic, federal secretary for finance, in his speech. I will confine myself to the part that refers to the financing of the YPA. Above all I would like to point out that the failure to fulfill the volume of funds planned for 1988 and the federal budget outline for 1989, which is based on an unrealistic assessment of nominal economic aggregates, are creating many problems in the planning and financing of the YPA even now. These problems may be even more pronounced next year if the high level of inflation continues.

(a) Speaking about the problems of financing this year and their being carried over to next year, it is essential to bear in mind that 6,269,900,000 dinars should be provided

as 4.94 percent of the present estimate of national income, which will probably be higher in reality. Up to the July budget readjustment, 4,592,400,000,000 dinars had been provided, and with the proposed further readjustment of the budget which is now being processed, 483.9 billion dinars will be added. This means that a total of 5,076,300,000,000 dinars will be provided, or 4 percent of the national income as currently estimated.

It should be borne in mind that the resources for YPA financing in the first 8 months of this year flowed in with an average delay of 30 days, which was also the delay in paying for our commitments for deliveries at home and abroad. We assess that as a result, the overall funds for YPA financing were reduced by 8 percent in real terms, or 0.41 percent of national income, and that they are in fact being provided at a rate of 3.85 percent of the estimated value of national income.

The portion of the funds that has not been provided amounts to 862 billion dinars [figure as published] and it will probably be larger once the final national income data are supplied. It is clear that the provision of the nominal value of these funds next year results in their being reduced in real terms to the extent of the rate of inflation.

We wish to inform you that we are carrying over these commitments to 1989 on the basis of two points. The first are bills actually due but not paid exceeding 400 billion dinars, and the second are commitments agreed to be postponed until the next year. One can conclude on this basis that at least some 50 percent of the commitments carried over should be paid at the beginning of the year, as is proposed in the draft budget of the federation for 1989.

(b) The proposed volume of funds for financing the YPA in 1989, amounting to 14,809,500,000,000 dinars, has been set on the basis of:

- the procedure for providing funds for this purpose as determined in the SFRY Constitution and the Federal Finance Act;
- the accepted reduction of value of the YPA financing funds in the Yugoslav Social Plan by 5 percent, or rather the determination of its volume at 4.94 percent of national income;
- the estimate of the national income by carrying over a rate of inflation of 78 percent and an increase in this rate by 60 percent in the course of the year, which means together a 133 [figures as published] percent rate of inflation.

The basic aim that really ought to be realized in the course of the next budget year, if the present problems in the implementation of the plans and the army development program are to be eliminated, is to provide stability and security in financing the army, which is the essence

of one of the constitutional amendments. It is only in this way that one can ensure that the real value of funds amounting to 4.94 percent of national income is provided. In all our assessments, the elements of which have been explained to you, this is the lowest limit, below which one cannot go, because not only the basic needs of combat readiness but also the implementation of the basic tasks of the army would be jeopardized.

The essential prerequisite for ensuring the real value of the percentage of national income for financing the YPA in 1989 which has been reduced in this way is to establish adequate sources which will provide the security and stability of the inflow of resources and their evaluation over the year, in line with inflation trends and the agreed scope of obligations that have been undertaken toward the military industry and other suppliers at home and abroad.

We have fitted plans for the tasks and financing of the YPA for next year into the material frameworks which proceed from the entire funds proposed in this draft federal budget. The structure of the tasks according to type, scope, and the dynamics of their realization are coordinated with the adapted medium-term plan for the development of the YPA for the period 1988-90, albeit to a reduced extent. We have presented the program for the tasks and financing of the YPA for 1989 to the Council for National Defense of the SFRY Assembly Federal Chamber which has already discussed and adopted it.

Priority in the distribution of resources according to basic purposes goes to maintaining the standard of military personnel at the level that has been reached and providing the elementary requirements of constant combat readiness and technical modernization with the focus on the supplies of weapons in the country. We will coordinate the living standard of the permanent personnel, as established by the law, with trends in the living standard in the country and thereby share the fate of the workers class and people to which the army belongs.

#### **Half the Resources for Development**

We are investing more than 50 percent of the total planned resources in development tasks. We are doing this despite the fact that the expenses of the life of the army are growing to an enormous extent, especially as regards food, uniforms, accommodation, and medical treatment. This orientation will particularly adversely affect the otherwise neglected construction and maintenance of infrastructure facilities, as well as the building up of reserves.

We will continue the process of taking the broadest measures and actions in order to increase savings, limit certain forms of spending, improve the organization of work and the effectiveness of business operations, and to



generally carry out tasks more rationally and economically. We will place the focus on implementing economic principles in the decisionmaking process and establishing the relationship between results and investment, particularly as far as the complex and expensive developmental programs are concerned. With the same aim, we will continue to perfect the process of expert assessments of projects along with the involvement of the widest circle of experts in society.

In line with the reform of the economic system, we will strive to adapt the work and business operations of the military industry as far as possible, as well as all activities connected with military-economic cooperation with foreign countries. We will strive to bring this entire production even more into the situation where it behaves in line with economic laws, and that means, among other things, in competition with the whole industry of Yugoslavia. Scientific-research work will consistently continue to rely on the total resources of society.

Considering the aims of housing policy reform, we will propose during next year a system of providing apartments for YPA members according to quite new bases. Essentially, we will try to find solutions according to which apartments will be provided by using personal resources in line with the financial possibilities and needs of every person. We would thus achieve significant economic results both in the construction and in the usage of housing.

It is well-known that the army is not a classic budgetary expense, but an active participant in the adoption of new technology and in economic development. Apart from that, its institutions, especially those whose operations are based on income accounting, will carry out important economic and social activities. In all these ways, about 65 percent of the entire funds which have been provided for financing the YPA will be returned to the economy.

Finally, comrades, I can inform you that in preparing the draft 1989 budget, and also independently of that, the army leaderships are continuously studying, evaluating, and seeking the best answer to the question of how one can best help the country find a way out of the economic crisis without threatening the the country's security today and tomorrow. The draft 1989 budget is based on the balance between these two demands along with the fact that a considerable part of the Yugoslav economy depends on the YPA budget.

#### **Media Response Favorable Toward Gorbachev Proposal**

##### **Zagreb Radio Commentary Assesses Gorbachev UN Speech**

*LD0912162488 Zagreb Domestic Service  
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 9 Dec 88*

[Milika Sundic commentary]

[Text] The predictions that Mikhail Gorbachev would make an important speech at the United Nations General Assembly were correct. The world has plenty of

reason to be satisfied with the decision by the Soviet Government to reduce the number of Armed Forces in Europe, Mongolia, and in the Soviet Far East and especially to change the Soviet war doctrine which, more than anything, will contribute to the creation of trust in the relations between East and West. It is also significant that there are no conditions connected to the Soviet decision and that it is not directly tied to the course and outcome of the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional armaments and military strike power in Europe. True, Gorbachev called on the big powers to follow the Soviet example, but if they do not, Moscow will not hold back from its intentions. Furthermore, when it is a matter of Western forces, they, in any case, took the view that the USSR has significant advantages in conventional armaments, so it could very easily happen that the Soviet decision is understood as recognition of this fact. This, of course, does not in any way reduce the importance of Gorbachev's move because it, at the very least, signifies a contribution to the future efforts in the direction of general and controlled disarmament, especially in Europe where the concentration of the military forces of the two blocs is most marked and most dangerous for peace.

With the latest proposals, which the General Assembly welcomed, Gorbachev imposed the topic of the talks with Reagan and Bush and in some way obliged them to understand his views as a sincere endeavor to improve international tensions. What is also new is that part of Gorbachev's speech, which related to the problem of Afghanistan, is that it is not just a call for a cease-fire but also a call for an international conference to be held on Afghanistan and for the blue helmets of the United Nations to be sent to this country. Even if the West were to see this as an open recognition of the failure of the Afghanistan adventure, nevertheless the fact cannot be denied that Gorbachev's recipe for peace in Afghanistan is more acceptable and realistic than all previous ones. Although he shortened his stay in New York because of the earthquake in Armenia, and dropped his visit to Cuba, Gorbachev's farewell to Reagan and his acquaintance with Bush will in any event have a significant influence on the overall relations between the USSR and the United States in the months ahead. Bush will in fact, at the beginning of his presidential term of office, be faced with the conciliatory Soviet challenge and because it is believed that in many ways he will go in front of Reagan, it would not be a surprise to anyone if, as early as next year, he has another meeting with Gorbachev, whether in Moscow or in Washington. This is all the more likely to happen if in the meantime agreement is reached on the reduction of strategic nuclear missiles by 50 percent. In any event, the Americans have understood or at least have begun to understand that Gorbachev is someone to be reckoned with in the long term, in particular his firm orientation that he is persisting with perestroika as the basis for all present and future steps, both in the internal and in the international sphere.



**Further Commentary**

*AU1012165188 Belgrade Domestic Service  
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 10 Dec 88*

[“Military commentary” by Todor Mirkovic]

[Text] (?With his) speech in the UN General Assembly, presenting the plan for a significant unilateral reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces, Mikhail Gorbachev surprised the world public in a positive sense of the word. According to Gorbachev, (?and his speech which) cannot be considered mere rhetoric, the USSR will, in the coming 2 years, reduce its Armed Forces by 500,000 men; withdraw from Hungary, the CSSR, and the GDR six armored divisions and some airborne and other units numbering 50,000 men; and withdraw a considerable part of its forces from Mongolia.

All the withdrawn units, as well as some within USSR territory, will be disbanded. In this way, (?the USSR will get rid of) 10,000 tanks, 8,000 (?artillery pieces), 800 combat planes, and large quantities of other military equipment. At the same time, military production will be reduced, and some of the military industry will be reoriented to carry out production to meet civilian needs.

By carrying out the above plan, the USSR obviously intends to, first, (?remove some of the) obstacles standing in the way of achieving new disarmament agreements, and second, carry out significant restructuring in

its Armed Forces in the coming period. In searching for ways in the negotiations on reduction of conventional forces and armaments, the United States and NATO stress that Soviet superiority in this kind of military power constitutes a serious obstacle.

After the latest Soviet decision and its implementation, (?these objections will probably) lose their importance. The need for restructuring the Soviet Armed Forces, and the intention to do so, has been indicated in the Soviet press. The November issue of the renowned journal, MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZHN, for instance, (?criticizes) the conservative concept of the present structure of the Soviet Armed Forces. (?In the) entire postwar period, stress has been laid on the strengthening of (?offensive) units, which are very expensive forces and their efficiency under modern warfare conditions could be uncertain. According to the journal, the USSR will (?strive) to build a smaller, but more modern army in the coming period.

The USSR decision on the unilateral reduction of conventional forces and armaments, which (?has been endorsed by) other Warsaw Pact member countries, is of (?great) international importance. It should open up a new stage in the development of international relations, in which armed forces and military force in general will play a smaller role.

## India

**Soviet Arms Supply to India To Remain Unaltered**  
52500011 *Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English*  
5 Oct 88 p 8

[Article by Dilip Mukerjee: "Soviet Army Transfers. Policy Shift Exempts India"]

[Text] "New thinking", the tag used to describe the changes made by Mr Mikhail Gorbachov to Soviet postures on international issues, presages a shift in Soviet policies on arms sales to the third world. But, like the exception which proverbially proves the rule, the supply relationship with India will undoubtedly remain unaltered.

This is evident from the just concluded visit to India of the Soviet defence minister, Gen. Dmitri Yazov, accompanied by the air and naval chiefs. As TASS reports, the USSR defence minister expressed complete understanding of the plans being carried out by India to strengthen its defence capacity. "The Soviet Union is sincerely striving to help peaceful India to be a mighty and prosperous state, capable of upholding its national interest, protecting its independence and sovereignty, and the cause of peace in Asia".

### Joint Effort

The day before, foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze had in his speech to the UN general assembly called for a joint effort to curb the international trade in arms. He described the growing spread of sophisticated conventional weapons as a dangerous development contributing to pointless regional conflicts. He suggested the UN should keep track of conventional arms transfers as a first step towards limiting them.

In line with the concept of sufficient defence "to avoid a competitive build-up of military forces, an important component of new thinking", the programme adopted by the Soviet Communist Party in 1986 calls for a freeze on force levels and armaments in "explosive parts of the world" to lessen the risks of armed conflict. As Mr Gorbachov said during his visit to New Delhi two years ago, he wants non-violence to be the norm in international relations.

The Soviet effort to make the world more peaceful gives high priority to the Asia-Pacific region. Security and stability in Asia, as Mr Shevardnadze said, affects the future of the entire world. The thinking underlying this formulation has not been spelled out, but Moscow presumably fears that conflicts in the region, adjoining Soviet borders, may drag in the great powers, notably China. The Soviet Union makes no secret of its keenness to regain China's friendship, and success is now within sight.

Restraint in arms sales is a logical corollary of these Soviet ideas. Since this cannot obviously be done unilaterally because arms sales are used as an important instrument of diplomacy by both superpowers. Moscow is signalling that Washington should join in it setting limits to this form of competition for building and consolidating friendships. The idea of a joint superpower initiative has been explicitly put forward by academician E. M. Primakov, a leading exponent of "new thinking".

### Renewed Thaw

Now that there is a renewed thaw, the threads can be picked up again with Moscow on taking the initiative. In one sense a beginning has already been made. In accordance with an understanding reached at the Moscow summit in May-June this year, experts of the two sides met in Washington on September 26 to discuss the scheme of export controls adopted by the US and the principal western nations last year to curb the spread of surface-to-surface missiles and the related technologies. Reports suggest that this preliminary meeting showed that Moscow shares the west's concerns.

Even if the superpowers manage to arrive at an understanding, limitation on transfers will not be wholly effective because of the growing share of others in the world's arms trade. The two accounted for 65 per cent of all transfers to the third world in 1977-81 but this was down in 1982-86 to less than 60 per cent. China has become a particularly important participant, witness the headlines made by its sales of missiles to Iran and Saudi Arabia. It can be assumed, however, that Moscow wants to make a start with a superpower accord, as in the case of nuclear arms control.

The problems that other suppliers may pose can be illustrated by considering the consequences of a hypothetical sale by China of the M-1 missile it is now developing to Pakistan. With a range of 600 km., the acquisition will set alarm bells ringing in India. Since it will take quite some time to develop indigenous missiles of equal range, New Delhi may turn to Moscow to close the gap. Though limiting the spread of missiles is important also in the context of checking nuclear proliferation, a very important object of Soviet policy, Moscow will be caught in an agonising dilemma.

In any event, holding back on arms sales poses far more problems for the Soviet Union than for the US. In terms of output and employment, the Soviet arms industry is the world's largest. According to American statistics, arms currently account for about a fifth of total Soviet exports as against 4 to 6 per cent in the US case. Wharton Econometrics, a US firm, estimates that almost three-quarters of Soviet sales to developing countries are for convertible currencies that Moscow badly needs to finance purchases of food, equipment and technology.

In fact, the Soviet initiative in displaying the MIG-29 and other military aircraft at the recent Farnborough air show suggests an effort to find new buyers on commercial terms to increase hard currency earnings. Other changes in arms sales policy, among them a readiness to sell the latest weapons, also point in the same direction. Sales to India help in this context; its competent use of weapons, in contrast with Syria's woeful performance in 1982, enhance their reputation.

Any understanding between the superpowers on restraining sales will, no doubt, take into account special interests of each side. It is, for instance, inconceivable that Washington will enter into an arrangement with Moscow, or even US allies, that affects the relationship with Israel. Likewise, Moscow will reserve the right to meet the needs of select friends, notably India.

#### **Sales to India**

Since China with its much larger military capabilities is not losing any sleep over the additions India is making to its arsenal, the only political factor that Moscow has to take into account is the alarm that sales to India cause in Pakistan. Although the Soviet Union is taking steps to mend relations with countries with which it has been at odds, as demonstrated by its dialogue with Thailand, Mr Gorbachov is unlikely to court Pakistan by opening a

security relationship as Mr Alexei Kosygin did following the Tashkent accord of 1966. An offer of more trade and aid to signify the Soviet interest in improving ties is, however, on the cards.

Dr Mahbubul Haq, the pace-setter among Pakistan's economic policy makers, has loudly proclaimed his interest in a substantial upgrading of exchanges with the Soviet Union, and this has elicited a favourable Soviet response. Although some prominent Pakistanis like former foreign minister Agha Shahi advocate a shift in the country's political stance towards a balanced relationship with both superpowers, a change of this kind is unlikely as long as substantial US military aid is forthcoming.

This explains why Gen Yazov has strongly reaffirmed the Soviet commitment to India. Judging from the contracts entered into since Mr Gorbachov took over in March 1985 for MIG-29s, and for TU-142 for long-range maritime reconnaissance, India can have the latest and the best of almost anything it wants, though perestroika with its emphasis on raising economic returns will mean higher prices. In fact, Mr Gorbachov expects his forthcoming visit to New Delhi to be "a long stride" in consolidating Indo-Soviet relations for the benefit of their peoples and in the interest of "general security"—as he said at Krasnoyarsk a few days ago.

12223

### **Inspectors Arrive in Colorado To Scrap Missiles**

*LD0512091888 Moscow TASS in English  
0754 GMT 5 Dec 88*

[Text] New York December 5 (TASS)—By TASS correspondent Andrey Sitov.

A group of ten Soviet inspectors arrived at a U.S. Army base in the city of Pueblo, Colorado, on Sunday. Yet another batch of Pershing missile engines, which are subject to elimination under the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty, will be scrapped there under the supervision of the Soviet military specialists.

The operation is to begin on Monday. The Colorado authorities gave consent to the elimination of six missile engines a day, weather permitting. Alan Kenitzer, a spokesman for the army base at Pueblo, has said a total of eighteen missile engines are to be destroyed there in the current month.

The elimination of the systems has been proceeding at the Longhorn Army Base in Texas since September 8, this year. Each Pershing missile has two engines. Under the INF Treaty, the USA should eliminate a total of 450 such missiles within two years.

The Soviet inspectors arrived at Pueblo from the Travis air base in California. They already visited the depot where missile engines are kept to mark those which are subject to elimination.

Such marking before the start of elimination makes it possible to see to it that precisely the designated systems get scrapped.

### **Pershing-2 Engines Destroyed in Colorado**

*LD0612001788 Moscow TASS in English  
0012 GMT 6 Dec 88*

[Text] New York December 6 TASS—TASS correspondent Anatoliy Lazarev reports:

Destruction of "Pershing-2" missile engines has begun at U.S. Army facilities near Pueblo (Colorado). This is provided for by the Soviet-American INF Treaty.

A total of 18 engines from nine rocket stages are to be destroyed. If the weather is favourable—and the health authorities [as received] of the State of Colorado are very exacting—the procedure will take 14 days.

"One engine has already been destroyed," the TASS correspondent was told by Kendell Peas, spokesman for the verification agency under the INF Treaty. In accordance with the stipulated procedure, he said, the engine

is fixed in a special concrete and steel structure. After being started, the engine works until it uses up all fuel, which requires around 60 seconds. The engine bodies will then be buried in an area specifically allocated for the purpose.

The verification agency spokesman said that under the provisions of the treaty the Americans were to inform the Soviet side about the upcoming destruction of engines 30 days in advance. Still, he was convinced that it was remarkable that the engine liquidation in Pueblo had begun on the eve of the first anniversary of the document. He said he was very glad that implementation of the treaty was proceeding so well. This was made possible thanks to the closest cooperation between the Soviet and American sides in this field. Mutual understanding, high professionalism and flexibility of American and Soviet specialists are very conducive to progress here, Peas said in conclusion.

"The Soviet-American INF Treaty," said Anatoliy Samakin, who leads the group of Soviet inspectors, "marks the start of real disarmament." He said that "now people can face the future with optimism."

### **Foreign Reactions to Gorbachev Announcement**

#### **TASS Cites FRG MP on Gorbachev UN Speech**

*LD1212070288 Moscow TASS in English  
0655 GMT 12 Dec 88*

[Text] Bonn December 12 TASS—The new Soviet peace initiatives set out by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in his speech at the United Nations Organization are of great historic importance, stated Dietrich Stobbe, deputy chairman of the foreign policy commission of the bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany, a deputy to the bundestag from the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD).

The Soviet Union's proposals on a unilateral reduction in its armed forces and conventional arms deserve an exceptionally positive appraisal, the parliamentarian emphasised. To a considerable extent they will promote the earliest start and successful conduct of talks to eliminate imbalances in the field of conventional arms in Europe. The Soviet initiatives acquire particular importance, considering the Soviet Union's intention to restructure its armed forces.

NATO's nuclear weapons modernisation programme, Stobbe said, obviously contradicts these actions of the Soviet Union. The North Atlantic alliance should come forward with its own concept of security and disarmament, in which all important political changes in the international arena, including the new peace initiatives of the Soviet Union, would find reflection.

**FRG's Dregger Welcomes USSR Peace Initiatives**  
*LD1112121488 Moscow TASS in English*  
*1202 GMT 11 Dec 88*

[Text] Bonn December 11 TASS—Alfred Dregger, chairman of the CDU-CSU group in the Bundestag, has positively assessed the new Soviet peace initiatives.

Mikhail Gorbachev's statement in New York about the Soviet Union's readiness to cut down its armed forces and first of all tank forces in Europe is of exceptionally positive importance, he emphasised in a Saar Radio interview.

At the same time Dregger came out against a "third zero option" and against making Europe a nuclear-free zone, pointing out that the nuclear missiles which are in service with NATO are an important element of the "strategy of deterrence".

Dregger criticised the West's stance in the field of the policy of security and disarmament. NATO allies, he emphasised, should work out a concept covering matters concerning reductions in both conventional and nuclear arms as soon as possible, and come forward with their own initiatives, and not take up a passive attitude while waiting for the Soviet leader's proposals.

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

### Officials React to Gorbachev Disarmament Proposals

#### Kohl Welcomes Proposals

LD0712202988 Hamburg DPA in German  
1944 GMT 7 Dec 88

[Excerpt] Hamburg (DPA)—The reduction by 500,000 men of the Soviet Army announced by Soviet state and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev this evening at the UN General Assembly in New York has been positively received in initial reactions from the Western world. According to Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl welcomed the reduction in conventional forces announced by Gorbachev as an "important step in the right direction." Above all he emphasized the withdrawal and the disbanding of tank units from the GDR, the CSSR, and Hungary. [passage omitted]

#### Further Reaction From Kohl

LD0912101988 Hamburg DPA in German  
0900 GMT 9 Dec 88

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal chancellor Helmut Kohl has welcomed state and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev's announcement to reduce Soviet Armed Forces in Europe and Asia by 500,000 men and to reduce considerable quantities of weapons and equipment. He told the Bundestag today that he saw in this a step in a direction which the West has called for a long time aimed at reducing the drastic conventional superiority of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

With Gorbachev's announcement and its future implementation, however, this superiority is not yet eliminated and the balance in conventional forces is not yet achieved. For the West, the value of the announced Soviet measures lie in the fact that the process of the asymmetrical reduction of arms will be continued according to the principle "whoever has more must disarm more". And it was in this that people were pinning their hopes. They wanted a world in which the security of all countries and peoples is guaranteed on a low level of arms. "This is the goal for which we will consistently continue to work".

Kohl stressed that Gorbachev wished to implement the announced measures unilaterally and without linking them with the upcoming negotiations on conventional stability in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. He called for the Vienna mandate talks to be successfully concluded now and for negotiations to begin at the beginning of the coming year. He believed that these negotiations will gain added impetus through the planned Soviet measures.

Regarding the negotiating concept passed by the NATO foreign ministers, the chancellor said that he noted with satisfaction that it planned many more far reaching reductions in troops and weapons. The goal remained to produce a stable balanced proportion of forces on a low level and to create a situation in Europe where no side has the ability to make a territory-seizing offensive and surprise attack. This has always been the case for the Western alliance.

#### Genscher Remarks On Gorbachev Proposal

LD0812110688 Hamburg DPA in German  
1007 GMT 8 Dec 88

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—With the latest Soviet announcement of drastic troop reductions "a new chapter in the history of disarmament can be opened," said Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Federal minister of foreign affairs. Genscher said today on Deutschlandfunk that Moscow's intention to reduce its Armed Forces by 500,000 men within 2 years will lead to a clear reduction of Eastern superiority in the non-nuclear sphere.

Negotiations on stability in the conventional sphere will quite certainly be facilitated by this step. For the West it is a question of balance on a lower level. The Soviet initiative is an important step in this direction.

Genscher emphasized the announced withdrawal of USSR tank units and artillery out of central Europe. This signifies a limitation in the Warsaw Pact states' capability to attack.

Genscher appeared convinced that Moscow is prepared to allow inspections to follow the announced measures. He came out against faint-heartedness, said that deeds had already followed Gorbachev's words, and said that others would follow. It will also become clear that the disarmament debate must concentrate on conventional disarmament as the central problem of European security. The question of the modernization of nuclear short-range missiles has been drawn too strongly into the center.

#### Defense Minister Remarks

AU0912131588 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG  
in German 9 Dec 88 p 2

["kk" report: "Scholz: Withdrawal Does Not Change the Threat"]

[Text] Williamsburg—Defense Minister Rupert Scholz called Gorbachev's announcements to reduce Soviet troops a "signal that has to be assessed very positively from the political point of view." However, Scholz, who has been on a visit to the United States since the beginning of this week, also expressed clear skepticism. The planned withdrawal of 50,000 soldiers and 5,000 tanks from Eastern Europe does "not change the threat in principle." The armed forces remaining in "the Soviet Union's frontyard states" are still big enough to start a

large-scale offensive and thus still have the "capability for invasion" even after the announced reduction. In addition, in case of a unilateral withdrawal there is no way for the West to check this process, which would be important particularly in view of the verification of conventional reductions that is difficult anyway.

In a talk with German journalists in Williamsburg, Scholz said that he was surprised by the contents of Gorbachev's speech, because his U.S. interlocutors in Washington, including Foreign Minister Shultz, had not had any special prior expectations with regard to the speech. The minister said that the contents now have to be studied thoroughly: "If it is implemented in this way, this would be a politically substantive step." The announcement will, however, not have any effect on the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles, which has been repeatedly propagated by Scholz in the United States: "One thing does not have anything at all to do with the other."

It is not necessary to discuss the strength and equipment of the Bundeswehr in this connection, even though Gorbachev's speech is "grist for the mill" of those who "consider the Bundeswehr obsolete because of the alleged absence of a threat." One must also not forget that the Soviet Union has always advocated the thesis of an existing overall balance. "If this had ever been so," Scholz said, "the Warsaw Pact would actually have to be inferior after the reductions."

#### Others React

LD0712190188 Hamburg DPA in German  
1750 GMT 7 Dec 88

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The Social Democrats assessed the proposals by Soviet state and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev in a first statement as "sensational." Karsten Voigt, representative of the SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, said that they [the proposals] must be assessed positively and unreservedly and that they demand a positive reaction from the West. He linked this with the demand that NATO should not go ahead with the planned modernization of nuclear short-range missiles.

Uwe Ronneburger, the FDP parliamentary group's spokesman on defense policy, said that Gorbachev's initiative can only be received positively. "If the USSR begins the announced disarmament steps and they can be verified, then it will also be possible for us to reduce accordingly," stated the FDP politician. Moscow should begin substantial measures as soon as possible so that the conference for arms control and disarmament can begin its work on the basis of reduced inequalities.

Rupert Scholz (CDU), Federal defense minister, stated that the announced reduction "would be a first step toward the reduction in the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, publicly admitted by Gorbachev himself." In it Scholz sees at the same

time "a first partial success of the persistent efforts by the West for more detente and mutual security." It is crucial that these announcements lead to actual and verifiable troop withdrawals and arms reductions.

#### Bundestag 'Question Hour' on Missile Modernization

AU0912123188 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER  
ALLGEMEINE in German 8 Dec 88 pp 1-2

["C.G." report: "Genscher: Modernization of Short-Range Nuclear Weapons Not Topical"]

[Text] Bonn, 7 December—During question hour in the Bundestag on the FRG Government's stance on the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons on Wednesday [7 December], the SPD expressed the suspicion that Chancellor Kohl has promised the United States and Great Britain to station new missiles in the FRG. Speakers from the coalition parties retorted that the decision need not be made at present. FRG Foreign Minister Genscher (FDP) stated that in NATO the Bonn Government has succeeded with its wish for an overall concept on the future defense structure. The concept is to be passed in spring 1989. "Isolated decisions prior to passing the overall concept are not planned," Genscher said. Modernization "is not topical at present." The "Lance" missiles stationed in the FRG will not be outdated until 1995. Within the NATO concept, the issue is the future of short-range missiles; the West should work out as soon as possible a mandate for registering the short-range weapons in terms of arms control policy and start negotiations on this with the East.

Genscher said that the Soviet superiority with regard to short-range weapons is oppressive. The FRG Government calls upon the Soviet Union to reduce at least part of them in order to contribute to European stability and to improve the basis of negotiations. The goal is clear mutual and verifiable reduction of land-based short-range missiles to equal upper limits. Bonn expects the Western partners to participate in the efforts to bring about negotiations. Nuclear artillery has to be reduced. The importance of nuclear weapons for deterrence lessens as their range gets shorter. In order to prevent any war, a balanced relationship of nuclear and conventional forces is necessary. It is the exclusive task of nuclear weapons to prevent a war. "The alliance is in favor of stable relations of power in Europe by means of disarmament in all fields," Genscher said. Conventional stability is "the central problem" for the FRG Government. Therefore, Bonn will do everything in order to bring about negotiations on this subject. The balance sheet of relations with the Warsaw Pact is a positive one, Genscher noted.

SPD security expert Voigt accused Genscher of throwing up a smokescreen with regard to the issue of modernization. Neither NATO nor the FRG Government has an overall concept, he said. Voigt expressed the fear that in

May the Bundestag will probably "be confronted with final decisions." The CDU/CSU wants new short-range missiles; the SPD does not want them. The CDU/CSU is pursuing a policy "to the right of the two-track decision," because it does not even make the introduction of new weapons dependent on the result of future negotiations and rejects a zero-option for short-range missiles from the very start. The SPD does not want to eliminate the Soviet threat with new weapons but by means of negotiations. However, the government has not even presented a framework for negotiations so far, Voigt said.

CDU foreign policy expert Ruehe announced that the NATO overall concept will make clear which steps are necessary to establish a future structure of nuclear deterrence and which possibilities of disarmament in the field of nuclear weapons might come from the concrete results of the conventional negotiations. A nuclear component of deterrence remains necessary to prevent war, Ruehe stated. This is possible with a minimum amount of nuclear forces. The number of nuclear weapons in Europe, which is given as 4,000 warheads at present, can be reduced to half. Even more reductions are possible if progress is made in conventional negotiations. Talks within the alliance are to lead to a drastic reduction of nuclear artillery. "We cannot renounce a limited number of short-range missiles," Ruehe said. The CDU/CSU is not in favor of a third zero-option.

#### **Government Reaction to Gorbachev Proposal**

AU0912130988 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG  
in German 9 Dec 88 p 2

["ub" report: "Kohl Particularity Welcomes Withdrawal of Troops From GDR"]

[Text] Bonn—The FRG Government, the parties supporting it, and the Parliamentary opposition have reacted positively and without any reservations to Gorbachev's unilateral disarmament initiative. The Bonn statements, which all express great respect for the Soviet general secretary, also voice the concern that the West is increasingly lagging behind in disarmament questions. FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher stressed that the announced withdrawal of tank units and artillery from central Europe also means a restriction of the Warsaw Pact states' capability to attack. For the SPD Karsten Voigt stated that, in view of the sensational Soviet steps, NATO should finally forego the planned modernization of short-range nuclear missiles and should instead immediately present an offer on the mutual reduction of these weapons systems to the Soviet Union.

According to Bonn's government spokesman, Friedhelm Ost, Chancellor Helmut Kohl particularly welcomes the withdrawal and disbanding of the tank units from the GDR, the CSSR, and Hungary by 1991, as "an important step in the right direction." Hans Jochen Vogel, SPD chairman and chairman of the SPD Bundestag group, spoke of a "historic moment." "The West should

now finally do something," the SPD chairman criticized. Gorbachev's initiative is a "bold step," FDP Chairman Otto Count Lambsdorff said, assessing the announcement from New York. In the view of SDP disarmament expert Egon Bahr, the West is now being tested as to "where it is capable of and ready for disarmament." After the withdrawal of six Soviet top-quality divisions, Bahr said, it will no longer be possible to speak of the Warsaw Pact's "capability for invasion."

The FRG foreign minister noted that Moscow's unilateral disarmament step will facilitate chances for negotiations on conventional stability in Europe. Now it is necessary to "courageously" seize the resulting chances and to lay aside "all faintheartedness and old thinking" on the part of many Western observers. The Soviet general secretary lets his words again be followed by deeds. It is not to be doubted that he is serious in his will for disarmament and cooperation. In the FRG foreign minister's view, the periods which have to date been used to calculate conventional disarmament will now become shorter. If Gorbachev's proposal is implemented within 2 years, "this is naturally an improvement of the security situation." Now the Western alliance has to concentrate on the necessary agreements for conventional disarmament, because this is the central problem of European security, Genscher said. The question of modernizing short-range systems has been put too much into the foreground.

Volker Ruehe, foreign policy expert of the CDU/CSU Bundestag group, called on the West to finally take the initiative and present proposals that can also convince its own people. Gorbachev's "very important initiative" shows that the Soviet general secretary is serious about modernizing his country. For this purpose, he has to reduce costs in the military area. The Soviets' unilateral step makes the Vienna negotiations on conventional stability easier. In no case must the West react routinely, Ruehe said.

For the Greens Otto Schily said that in peace policy the only ones who are credible are those who do not only request the other side to disarm but start with themselves and do not shy away from the historic chance to overcome the confrontation between the blocs. With determination Gorbachev is clearing away the debris of the old policy of confrontation. Unfortunately, to date the Western governments and in particular the FRG Government have not been able to bring themselves to submitting similarly far-reaching proposals.

FDP Deputy Feldmann admonished Kohl by saying that the chancellor would certainly not make any promises "for which there is no majority." Any decision at present on modernization "would be wrong." One must not make an isolated or precipitate decision. "The FDP does not agree to compensating for the intermediate-range weapons that have to be eliminated," Feldmann said. Modernization is not a precondition for the reduction of



nuclear battlefield weapons; disarmament of both systems is possible and necessary. The FDP does not want disarmament by scrapping but by negotiating. Feldmann said that it is a "wrong signal" to fix modernization before the beginning of new negotiations. However, it would also be wrong to free the Soviet Union from any pressure for negotiations by saying "no" now.

For the Greens, Deputies Mechttersheimer and Beer said that the FRG Government wants to "neutralize the effect of" the first disarmament agreement—on intermediate-range missiles—with new longer-range short-range missiles and planes with proximity weapons [Abstands-waffen]. The reduction of intermediate-range weapons is to be undermined with "a program of exchanging carriers for the same warheads." SPD Deputies Katrin Fuchs, Stobbe, and Horn spoke of "hypocrisy" because the government is speaking of modernization but is striving to compensate for the intermediate-range missiles with new weapons.

#### **Press on NATO Reaction**

AU0912095388 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network  
in German 0605 GMT 9 Dec 88

[From the press review]

[Text] The following are excerpts from editorials on NATO's reaction to the announcement of unilateral Soviet troop reductions by Soviet state and party chief Gorbachev.

The NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG writes on this subject: The foreign ministers of the 16 NATO states have quickly adjusted to the new political situation, which Mikhail Gorbachev created the day before with his bold advance on the disarmament question. The Brussels conference did not just put off the Soviet state and party chief with noncommittal diplomatic praise for the spectacular initiative, but it briefly summarized the ideas of the Western alliance on the reduction of conventional weapons in order to show Gorbachev through a concrete answer that the NATO states have understood his signal. However, the Brussels proposal, which offers upper thresholds for conventional means of destruction to the Warsaw Pact, seems pale compared with the sensational announcements of the Kremlin leader. In the current form it does not live up to the political consequences, which are expressed in the Soviet plan. Gorbachev wants to fulfill the main demand of the West by giving the Soviet Armed Forces a clearly defensive assignment. NATO cannot react to the strategic change that has been announced simply by citing military figures. It must also take into account the new political dimension. Otherwise, Gorbachev will continue to set the tone, the NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG says.

The NEUE WESTFAELISCHE in Bielefeld writes on the same topic: The NATO foreign ministers seem to have understood the signal from New York. It took the Western alliance a long time to adopt a uniform position toward the new policy of the Soviet Union. Instead of presenting its own disarmament concept, the West reacted to old proposals by Gorbachev. Now those in Brussels dared to take a step forward. Now parity is to be reached with regard to certain kinds of arms: 20,000 tanks on either side should be enough for future defense, according to NATO. This is a specific offer, which can be negotiated. The responsible forum, the Vienna talks on conventional armament control, has been idling much too long, the NEUE WESTFAELISCHE notes.

The FRANKFURTER NEUE PRESSE assesses the new Soviet disarmament initiative in the following way: If Gorbachev's promise is kept, the Warsaw Pact is still superior to NATO by far more than two times. It cannot be assessed how much the initiative means from the military point of view, because the USSR will hardly scrap its most modern tanks, planes, or guns. Little will change in the imbalance. Measured by the real military power, this initiative, too, is not much more than a symbol—unless real movement starts in the international negotiations on the mutual, balanced reduction of war potentials. Only then will Moscow face the hour of truth, the FRANKFURTER NEUE PRESSE stresses.

#### **Chancellor Kohl Speaks on Defense Issues**

LD1312152288 Hamburg DPA in German  
1432 GMT 13 Dec 88

[Excerpts] Wuerzburg (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has appealed to Federal citizens not to ease their defense efforts. Addressing 450 generals, admirals and colonels in command positions, Kohl said at the 30th command conference in Wuerzburg on Tuesday that the Federal Government will continue to represent "aggressively" the order and role of the Federal Army in the face of a concerned public. The present problem of the acceptance of the Armed Forces can be solved only jointly by politicians and the military. [passage omitted]

Kohl called on the Soviet Union to abandon unilaterally and without preconditions part of its short-range potential. NATO will have to determine its attitude to nuclear short-range missiles within the framework of a total concept. A third zero-option in the area of nuclear systems with a range of below 500 km is out of the question. The United States is quite right to demand a convincing European contribution. Roles, risks, and responsibilities within the alliance must be shared fairly.